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THE INFRINGEMENT OF PRISONERS’ RIGHT TO VOTE: AN ANALYSIS 
OF INTENTIONS AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES IN DUE CONSIDERATION 
OF RECENT JUDGEMENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A. General Outline of the Subject in Question 
The right to vote is the most important and often even the only possibility of citi-
zens to participate in a democracy’s governance. Generally accepted democratic 
principles like the electoral equality and the objective to include all citizens who 
have acquired their full age and are of sound mind in the decision-making process 
demand that disenfranchisement may – if at all – only occur in very exceptional 
cases. However, laws infringing prisoners’ right to vote are widespread and differ 
greatly among established democracies: While some states do not impose any re-
strictions on the right of prisoners to vote, others (like many states in the USA) ex-
clude most or all of their detainees from taking part in elections, sometimes even af-
ter their release.1 Even though this phenomenon pertains to core issues of democ-
ratic principles as well as central human rights aspects, it has not been subject to 
noteworthy public debate for a long time. Due to several decisions of national con-
stitutional courts and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) within the last 
decade, felony disenfranchisement has gained more attention among legal academ-
ics. Still, most of this literature is limited to the specific arguments which have been 
brought forward in the particular court procedures. From my point of view, a holis-
tic analysis which seeks to give a general recommendation whether or not to grant 
prisoners the right to vote – and if so, what restrictions may still be feasible – must 
not only focus on a national context, but has to consider legal philosophic and po-
litical issues, too. The long grinding debate which is going on in the British Parlia-
ment about the amendments demanded by Strasbourg’s European Court of Human 
Rights2 (ECtHR) emphasises the practical necessity of such a study.3 
                                               
1 See C Uggen et at ‘Punishment and Social Exclusions: National Differences in Prisoner Disenfran-
chisement’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International 
Perspective (2009) 59 at 61-63. 
2 Hirst v. United Kingdom (No 2), App. No. 74025/01 6 October 2005 (Grand Chamber Decision), 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/eng [last accessed on 15 October 2011]. 
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B. Approach to the Topic 
The thesis at hand analyses in what way and to what extent general principles of 
democracy and human rights are affected by restrictive disenfranchisement laws. 
Recent court decisions will provide a basis to outline critical aspects of disenfran-
chisement among legal provisions in different countries. Still, the objective is nei-
ther to give a (comparative) analysis of these rulings nor to deal comprehensively 
with special rules of national legislation. Rather, the intention is to distil related as-
pects from case law as well as from academic literature in order to give a general 
recommendation how to reconcile prisoners’ democratic and human rights as well 
as society’s interest in the legitimacy of democratic representation with the purpose 
of punishment and the extraordinary conditions connected with imprisonment. 
Chapter I will briefly overview the history of felony disenfranchisement as some 
historical background is required to understand the development of prisoners’ rights 
and especially the advancing separation of disenfranchisement and the purposes of 
punishment.  
Chapter II seeks to define the nature of the right to vote. The question, whether the 
right to vote is (only) a democratic right, also a protected human right or even part 
of the human dignity determines the scope of possible limitations. Thus, the distinc-
tion is not only an academic question but also had a direct impact on recent court 
decisions. 
On the basis of these fundamental considerations, the minor dissertation seeks to 
analyse the impact of felony disenfranchisement: Chapter III focuses on the indi-
vidual (ie penal) context centred on the question whether the infringement of crimi-
nals’ right to vote may serve as an adequate form of additional punishment. In con-
trast, Chapter IV discusses the measurement’s impact on society and democracy as 
a whole. As the exclusion of a certain group of citizens may undermine the legiti-
macy of the whole electoral procedures, this issue will form the core of the work at 
hand which aims to focus rather on democratic theory than on criminal law.  
                                                                                                                                   
3 For an overview of the debate see eg D Hannan ‘Does Parliament have the courage to defy this 
man?’ Daily Mail (6 February 2011), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-
1354084/Prisoner-vote-ban-Does-Parliament-courage-defy-John-Hirst.html [last accessed on 15 
October 2011]. 
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Having discussed the impacts of disenfranchisement, Chapter V will deal with prac-
tical problems which are connected with prisoners’ franchise such as a fair alloca-
tion of votes, proper administration of the electoral process and the provision of suf-
ficient objective information. Suggestions how to handle these difficulties will show 
that they are by no means unsolvable.  
To round up the analysis, Chapter VI will outline reasonable differentiations of re-
strictions. This is of particular relevance for the practice because most of the recent 
judgements which declared restrictions invalid did so because the legislative basis 
lacked the necessary balance and proportionality, ie mostly contained a ‘blanket 
ban’. Legislative authorities that do not generally want to refrain from the imposi-
tion of electoral sanctions on criminals ought to consider these issues in order to 
pass legislation which is in line with constitutional requirements. 
Finally, a recapitulatory conclusion will assemble the results from the individual 
chapters and suggest coherent ways how to shape and design legislation without 
violating constitutional or human rights principles. 
 
CHAPTER I: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT  
The exclusion of certain groups of individuals from the electoral participation proc-
ess has a long tradition and even today there is no universal definition of the ‘elec-
tor’.4 While modern democracies, nevertheless, have found comparable standards 
for quasi all regulations of suffrage, felony disenfranchisement laws today are the 
most – or maybe even the only – noteworthy field of disparate embodiment.5 A 
view back in history may help to understand the accruement of the current hetero-
geneity. 
                                               
4 C Gallagher, ‘The Captive Vote: Prisoners’ Suffrage in Ireland’, (2001) 1 University College Dub-
lin LR 1. 
5 However, it is worth to recall that the definition of suffrage has been in progress for most of the 
time since democratic systems were established: Women’s suffrage which is today seen as a matter 
of course was only established after longsome struggles, see eg SD O’Connor ‘History of the 
Women's Suffrage Movement’ (1996) 49 Vanderbilt LR 657. In terms of demeny voting, democra-
cies’ current rules are indeed similar (see eg L Massicotte et al ‘Establishing the Rules of the Game: 
Election Laws in Democracy’ (2004) 15-24), but lively discussions in several countries illustrate that 
regulations of franchise are still on the move (see WC Sanderson and S Scherbov ‘A Near Electoral 
Majority of Pensioners: Prospects and Policies’ (2007) 33 Population and Development Review 543 
at 548).  
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Taking into account that penalties for crimes tended to be much harsher in former 
times while electoral equality and inclusion have not been considered to be as im-
portant as today, it is little surprising that prisoners have already been disenfran-
chised in the antiquity. In ancient Greece for example, prison inmates as well as 
former detainees were stigmatised as ‘infamous’ and lasting sanctions infringed a 
large number of personal freedoms, such as freedom of speech, freedom of assem-
bly as well as the access to civil service and the right to vote.6 Penalties affecting 
the culprits’ rights in society were even severer in ancient Rome: There, felons lost 
their ‘honour’ and consequently also their position as fully-fledged citizens.7 
Among today’s common law countries, early criminal law took a similar approach 
to the continental jurisdictions: In Anglo-Saxon Britain criminals were deprived of 
central public and private rights – not only did they lose their right to legal protec-
tion; they were also deprived of the right to hold property and other important civil 
rights.8 Due to the influence of British settlers, the early disenfranchisement laws of 
the United States of America have mostly been based on the same British legal 
principles.9 Still, felony disenfranchisement in the US only became a practical issue 
after the American Civil War when the right to vote was no longer limited to white 
male property owners.10 Thenceforward restrictions of prisoners’ voting rights 
served as an instrument to design universal suffrage in a seemingly race-neutral way 
while factually the limitations were tailored to disadvantage the black population.11 
Among the southern states – which particularly adopted a racially influenced cate-
gorization of offenses – Mississippi shows an extreme example: there, the commit-
ment of ‘furtive offenses’ such as theft usually led to the perpetrator’s disenfran-
chisement, while ‘robust crimes’ like murder did not necessarily result in an in-
                                               
6 AS Johnson-Parris ‘Felon Disenfranchisement: The Unconscionable Social Contract Breached’ 
(2003) 89 Virginia LR 109 at 114. 
7 NV Demleitner, ‘Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon Dis-
enfranchisement as an Alternative’ (1999/2000) 84 Minnesota LR 753 at 757. 
8 J Fellner and M Mauer, ‘Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the 
United States’ (1998) 2, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/vote [last accessed on 16 October 
2011]. 
9 EA Hull, ‘The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons’ (2006) 17; WW Liles, ‘Challenges to Felony Dis-
enfranchisement Laws: Past, Present, and Future’ (2006-2007) 58 Alabama LR 615 at 617; RA Len-
hardt ‘Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality’ (2004) 79 NYU LR 803 at 917. 
10 J Fellner / M Mauer, ‘Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the 
United States’ (1998) 3, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/vote [last accessed on 16 October 
2011]; RL Nunn, ‘Lock them up and Throw away the Vote’ (2004-2005) 5 Chicago J Int’l Law 763 
at 765. 
11 JM Kousser, ‘The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the 
One-Party South, 1880-1910’ (1974) 45-54. 
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fringement of suffrage.12 Since property crimes were mainly ascribed to black peo-
ple while violent crimes were rather associated with Caucasians, this distinction was 
obviously determined by racial motives.13 
While disenfranchisement provisions in the United States did not succumb to note-
worthy alterations until the middle of the 20th century,14 franchise policies in conti-
nental Europe underwent more changes: Already among the Teutons more differen-
tiated practices were developed and felons’ rights of participation were no longer 
linked to the individual’s relation to the state and/or the state’s authorities but rather 
dependent on the person’s standing in society.15 Thus, not every crime but only 
‘dishonourable’ ones led to a forfeiture of certain civil rights.16 In the early modern 
age, an intensive thought-process which had its source in the era of enlightenment 
continuously fuelled the debate about penology in general and felony franchise in 
particular: Cum grano salis, the role of the individual in s ciety as a whole gained 
more and more significance and thus, punitive measurements received a more indi-
vidual shape.17 Especially in France, the mort civile – a form of public humiliation 
emanating from old roman penology – was increasingly considered to be undiffer-
entiated and unjust.18 The hitherto prevailing purpose of deterrence was more and 
more replaced by the idea of reintegration. Therefore, the catalogue of penalties was 
revised and measurements of public humiliation were widely abolished.19 In the 
same process, felony disenfranchisement laws were scrutinised und publicly dis-
cussed. It was at this time around the middle of the 19th century that the infringe-
ment of prisoners’ right to vote was no longer discussed only in terms of penology 
                                               
12 AL Shapiro, ‘Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement under the Voting Rights Act: A New 
Strategy’ (1993-1994) 103 Yale LJ 537 at 541. 
13 RK Scher, ‘The politics of disenfranchisement: Why is it so hard to vote in America?’ (2011) 53; 
M Mauer, ‘Felon Voting Disenfranchisement: a Growing Collateral Consequence of Mass Incarcera-
tion’ (2000) 12 Fed Sentencing Rep 1 at 3. 
14 JM Kousser, ‘The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the 
One-Party South, 1880-1910’ (1974) 8. 
15 E Kühne, ‘Die Ehrenstrafen - Insbesondere auch Rechtsvergleichend und Rechtsgeschichtlich 
Dargestellt’ (1931) 11-12. 
16 See ibid. During the middle ages the importance of the culprit’s standing in society became even 
more visible as the punishment of ‘dishonourable crimes’ was carried out publicly and was based on 
naming and shaming methods, see O Schwarz, ‘Die Strafgerichtliche Aberkennung der Amtsfähig-
keit und des Wahlrechts: Eine rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung aus der Sicht der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland und der Vereinigten Staaten’ (1991) 22-26. 
17 F Weithase, ‘Über den Bürgerlichen Tod als Straffolge’ (1966) 91. 
18 A Esser, ‘Die Ehrenstrafe’ (1956) 89. 
19 NV Demleitner, ‘Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon Dis-
enfranchisement as an Alternative’ (1999/2000) 84 Minnesota LR 753 at 757. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
6 
 
but also attracted attention from democratic theorists.20 On the substantiated basis of 
moral and political philosophers’ ideas, the classic dispute whether felony disen-
franchisement was a justified measurement to ‘keep the ballot box clean’ or if it 
rather undermined democratic legitimacy emerged.21 Depending on the political af-
filiation of the particular nations, a patchwork of felony franchise legislation un-
folded on the continent.22  
After a short epoch dominated by conservatism and nationalism in the forefront of 
World War I when individual interests were rolled back and hence disenfranchise-
ment regulations were tightened,23 suffrage legislation in Western Europe was in-
creasingly questioned and widely liberalised: in Germany, for example, a major 
overhaul of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) in the 1960s gave greater 
weight to reintegration and limited the possibility of prisoners’ disenfranchisement 
to exceptional cases: according to the new section 45 para 5 of the revised Criminal 
Code, disenfranchisement may only be imposed as an incidental consequence (Ne-
benfolge) in conjunction with certain crimes24 and is limited to a limited period (no 
longer than five years).25 The limitation to specific crimes (in practice crimes which 
are related to the election process, like election fraud, bribery of voters or similar 
offenses)26 ensures that restrictions of franchise are only implemented when they 
are part of a coherent penalisation. Due to these strict prerequisites, the scope of 
disenfranchisement’s application is very limited: in practice, the number of annual 
impositions averages around ten cases and most people in Germany do not even 
know that the sanction exists.27 
In the United Stated however, prisoner’s disenfranchisement today is a broadly dis-
cussed mass phenomenon. The Civil Rights movement in the 1960s lead to several 
                                               
20 MK Dhami, ‘Prisoner Disenfranchisement Policy: A Threat to Democracy?’ (2005) Analyses of 
Social Issues and Public Policy 235 at 239. 
21 This controversy, which is still current, will be holistically discussed in Chapter IV. 
22 G Brooks, ‘Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics’ (2004-2005) 32 Ford-
ham Urban LJ 851 at 852. 
23 C Roxin, ‘Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil Band I: Grundlagen - Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre’ 
4ed (2005) 87. 
24 That means, there is an exclusive catalogue of criminal offences, according to which the right to 
vote may be restricted. 
25 A Schönke and H Schröder, ‘Strafgesetzbuch: Kommentar’ 28ed (2010) Section 45 para 5 mn 1. 
26 O Schwarz, ‘Die Strafgerichtliche Aberkennung der Amtsfähigkeit und des Wahlrechts: Eine 
rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung aus der Sicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Vereinig-
ten Staaten’ (1991) 50-54. 
27 NV Demleitner, ‘Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon Dis-
enfranchisement as an Alternative’ (1999/2000) 84 Minnesota LR 753 at 761. 
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amendments of statutes: especially most of the former distinctions between different 
crimes have been replaced in order to avoid a race-discriminatory interrelation be-
tween certain offences and the loss of franchise.28 Therefore, a ‘blanket ban’ of 
prisoners’ voting rights today is very common among most American states: the 
majority of states infringe culprits’ franchise ‘only’ during the period of incarcera-
tion, but eleven states even disenfranchise ex-felons.29 Only Maine and Vermont do 
not deprive any offenders of the right to vote.30 
Although this historical overview helps to understand the development of felony 
franchise laws and reveals the most important influencing factors, it does not off-
handedly display structural conditions that show why some states are strict on pris-
oner voting while others prefer a rather liberal approach.  
One possible explanation has been discussed by Blais et al and refers to the 
‘strength’ of a democracy: According to the authors’ study, ‘strong’ democracies 
are less likely to disenfranchise prison inmates. This thesis is substantiated by the 
assumption, that ‘stable’ democracies’ authorities were less scared that the influ-
ence of prison inmates might undermine the democratic system as a whole as felons 
are suspected to be less supportive for moderate democratic governments.31 How-
ever the authors point out, that even among ‘strong’ democracies, about one third 
has strict disenfranchisement laws in practice.32 Hence, the observations of Blais et 
al give a worthy tendency but cannot provide a fully coherent explanation.  
Another factor that may influence a country’s disenfranchisement laws is the level 
of the incarceration rate. According to data, collected and analysed by Uggen et al, 
a higher incarceration rate correlates with more restrictive felony franchise laws.33 
Again, the above stated argument that prisoners might have a more critical attitude 
towards the democratic system is put forward as a possible explanation: Different to 
                                               
28 G Brooks, ‘Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics’ (2004-2005) 32 Ford-
ham Urban LJ 851 at 859. 
29 TJ Miles, ‘Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout’ (2004) 33 J Legal Stud 85. 
30 Ibid. 
31 A Blais et al ‘Deciding Who Has the Right to Vote: A Comparative Analysis of Election Laws’ Pa-
per prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association At-
lanta (1999) available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379499000621 [last 
accessed on 20 October 2011]. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See C Uggen et at ‘Punishment and Social Exclusions: National Differences in Prisoner Disen-
franchisement’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an Interna-
tional Perspective (2009) 59 at 69-74. 
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new or unstable democracies, in this context it is the sheer mass of potential crimi-
nal electors which causes fear and leads to a restrictive legislation.34 
A different approach of classification which has not been discussed so far is to ana-
lyse a nation’s attitude towards the responsibility and freedom of the individual citi-
zens. From on the middle of the 20th century franchise rules can be mapped in a 
quite structured way: In the course of the world’s division according to the ideo-
logical spheres of communism and capitalism in the aftermath of World War II, the 
Eastern European countries developed rather restrictive policies in terms of prison-
ers’ franchise,35 while most of the Western-oriented countries implemented more 
liberal franchise regulations. Interestingly, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, many of 
the Eastern European countries adjusted their legislation and implemented more 
balanced and liberal felony franchise laws.36 From my point of view, this develop-
ment for the first time in history reveals a coherent conjunction of a society’s self-
conception and its exposure to felony vote: generally speaking, societies which fo-
cus on the individual person are more willing to grant general participation rights 
notwithstanding the individual’s misconduct. In contrast, social systems that 
(over)emphasise the collective tend to protect their model by excluding potentially 
deviating opinions. Although I consider this approach to be more convincing than 
any of the above stated attempts of categorisation, one has to admit that again coun-
terexamples can be found – the United States being the most obvious one – and that 
the definition of a society’s self-conception is difficult and often remains vague. 
This chapter has shown that the development of felony franchise laws was far from 
linear and change is still in progress. Due to the change of values, former laws and 
conditions may only help to better conceive current debates; by no means, they may 
serve as an example for today’s modern legal order. Still, it would be too trivial to 
stigmatise criminal disenfranchisement laws as outdated or reactionary. Rather, the 
historic overview has highlighted that the issue has always been a highly political 
one and very much dependent on the self-image of a state’s society. Therefore, it is 
impossible to define fully coherent criteria according to which one could categorize 
                                               
34 Ibid. 
35 No attention shall be paid to the democratic quality of these elections for now.  
36 See ‘European Prisoner Disenfranchisement Regimes’, a table compiled from information gath-
ered by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office in January 2011 and from research conducted by 
lawyers at the UK Ministry of Justice in 2010, available at http://bit.ly/uGGzP9 [last accessed on 29 
October 2011]. 
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states’ felony franchise legislation. Nevertheless, the discussed grouping may serve 
as a viable indication for the analysis of political goals. 
 
CHAPTER II: THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE  
The question under which preconditions the right to vote may – if at all – be sus-
pended is closely linked to its nature: Is the right to vote rather a privilege granted 
by the state to its citizens, ie an ordinary democratic right or is it also an acknowl-
edged human right or maybe even part of the human dignity? While this work’s 
Chapter IV will deal with the impact of prisoners’ disenfranchisement on a democ-
ratic society (ie the effects and possible justifications of the measure), the aim of the 
chapter at hand is to analyse which restrictions may generally be licit and which 
boundaries of limitation can be derived from the nature of universal suffrage. 
 
A) The Right to Vote as a Democratic Right 
The classification of the right to vote as a democratic – or in other words: constitu-
tional right is quite obvious.37 But does this categorisation itself help to identify 
boundaries for possible limitations? As democratic rights are not of an absolute na-
ture38, their concrete shape depends – to a certain extent – on the design of a state’s 
national constitution.39 Due to the great variety of specific national characteristics, 
constitutional courts in different states have come to different results regarding the 
constitutionality of felony disenfranchisement in different countries. The evaluation 
at hand does not seek to go into details of national constitutional legislation. It 
rather aims to detect universally accepted appreciations of values and seeks to ex-
plain their impact on the limitation of felony franchise laws.  
It is generally acknowledged, that within the liberal democratic constitutional 
model, elections can be structured in quite different ways without the democratic 
                                               
37 See eg A Keyssar, ‘The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States’ 
(2009) at 287-290. 
38 See eg JS Schacter, ‘Unenumerated Democracy: Lessons from the Right to Vote’ (2006-2007) 9 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 457 at 460. 
39 For example, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution explicitly allows the 
disenfranchisement of prisoners when it prohibits the denial of franchise ‘except for participation in 
rebellion, or other crime’. 
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character itself being affected.40 However, restrictions on the electorate may only be 
implemented in exceptional cases and must be justified properly. Otherwise, grant 
and execution of power get out of balance and governmental legitimacy is under-
mined.41 While there seems to be a broad consensus on the existence of some objec-
tive prerequisites for franchise such as citizenship, age or mental competency, the 
extent to which ‘unfavoured’ members of a society are granted participation rights 
differs greatly.42  
With regard to legal aspects, there are two main approaches, how to define possible 
limitations of the right to vote as a democratic right: The first one focuses on the 
origins of democratic participation while the second one gives greater weight to the 
principle of equality and the legitimacy of the election result. 
 
I) The Right to Vote as a Reward for Rendered Sovereignty 
John Locke, a precursor of the first approach, understood the right to vote as a re-
ward for transferred sovereignty according to the Hobbesian ‘social contract’43 in 
connection with the foundation of states. According to his view, individuals who 
break this contract – like prisoners have done – do no longer deserve compensation: 
their right to participation forfeits.44 A recent statement by Ted Morten, a respected 
professor for political science at the University of Calgary, reveals that Locke’s jus-
tification is still part of the current debate. Morten outlined that 
‘Those who break th[e] first responsibility of good citizenship [the obedience of the 
law] thus forfeit (temporarily) its first privilege – voting for the law-makers. To al-
low those who break the law to make the law is an insult to all law-abiding citizens 
and devalues the meaning of citizenship.’45 
At first glance, this argumentation may seem to be coherent. However, a more de-
tailed look reveals various inconsistencies: The idea that citizens do actively agree 
                                               
40 For instance, electoral laws among democracies differ greatly although their shape (majority vot-
ing system, proportional representation or mixed system) pretty much determines the composition of 
parliaments. 
41 A Ewald and B Rottinghaus ‘Introduction’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disen-
franchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 1 at 2. 
42 See WA Powers, ‘Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2): A First Look at Prisoner Disenfranchisement 
by the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005-2006) 21 Connecticut J Int’l Law 243. 
43 Thomas Hobbes, ‘Leviathan’ (1651). 
44 See eg the remarks in G Brooks, ‘Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, and Politics’ 
(2004-2005) 32 Fordham Urban LJ 851 at 853-854. 
45 T Morten, ‘No Pros to Cons’ Vote’ Calgary Sun 25 September 1998. 
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to some kind of contract is a very theoretical one. Although the laws and rules of a 
state have to be respected by everyone, there is no formal act of acknowledgement 
by the citizens. Just like nobody can publicly (and effectually) declare, he or she 
does not adhere to certain laws, the act of becoming a politically mature citizen 
cannot be interpreted as an implied acknowledgement of a state’s whole legal sys-
tem. Just as little can one single felonious breach be put on one level with the repu-
diation of the entire ‘social contract’.46 Moreover, the legal consequences of a 
breach of the law are already put down in a country’s national criminal code. There, 
the quality of a specific misbehaviour is thoroughly balanced and degrees of penalty 
are stipulated. Hence, there is no need to refer to the vague instrument of a ‘social 
contract’, especially since legal consequences which limit certain of the ‘contract 
rights’, may well be adopted in the national criminal code itself. 
 
II) Universal Suffrage as a Pillar of Legitimate Representation in a Democratic 
Society 
The second (and more modern) approach considers the right to vote no longer as a 
privilege granted as a compensation for the transfer of personal sovereignty but as a 
part of the foundation of a free and democratic society.47 The important practical 
difference of this perception is that franchise laws are no longer examined exclu-
sively in an individual context; rather it is acknowledged that limitations of the 
principle of universal suffrage tend to undermine democratic validity of the legisla-
ture and the laws which it promulgates.48 In Sauvé v Canada the Canadian Constitu-
tional Court has made a universally valid statement when it said ‘because the gov-
ernment takes its authority from the vote, it cannot pick and choose who is entitled 
to vote’.49 The exclusion of a particular group of citizens must therefore be recon-
cilable with the underlying purposes of the right to vote. Additionally, the regula-
tion of franchise must not diminish the effectiveness and integrity of the electoral 
                                               
46 AS Johnson-Parris, ‘Felon Disenfranchisement: The Unconscionable Social Contract Breached’ 
(2003) 89 Virginia LR 109 at 131. 
47 WA Powers, ‘Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2): A First Look at Prisoner Disenfranchisement by the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2005-2006) 21 Connecticut J Int’l Law 243 at 294-295. 
48 D Guttman, ‘Before the High Court – Roach v Commonwealth: Is the Blanket Disenfranchisement 
of Convicted Prisoners Unconstitutional?’ (2007) 29 Sydney LR 297 at 310. 
49 Sauvé v Canada (No 2), 3 SCR (2002) 519 at 13. 
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process – maybe one could even demand that restrictions have to be an explicit req-
uisite to uphold these principles.  
But in which cases may limitations really be appropriate or necessary to uphold 
democratic principles – or put differently with regard to criminals: can one really 
assume that citizens who have broken the law are less qualified to decide about the 
governance of a country?  
 
1) Aristotle: Criminal Offense as a Disqualifying Proof of Selfishness 
Citizenship is indeed the most common indicator of membership in a political 
community. According to some legal academics, however, this criterion alone is not 
sufficient to define the electorate because it cannot ensure an adequate ‘nexus to the 
community’ which is required for the exercise of full membership rights.50 The 
question is how to define this additional ‘nexus to the community’? Already in the 
antiquity, Aristotle has demanded, democracy required morally virtuous citizens 
who would rule for the common good rather than for their own self-interest.51 Ac-
cordingly, one could argue that individuals who break the law for their personal 
gain by harming other persons or the society as a whole (like eg thieves or tax 
dodgers) do no longer fulfil Aristotle’s criteria and should thus be excluded from 
the participation process.  
Although Aristotle’s altruistic approach is evidence of high moral standards, it ap-
pears to be a bit out of touch with today’s actualities: as many people silently cast 
their vote according to their (potential) personal gain, certain criminals have ‘only’ 
displayed their attitude through a visible act. However, this act of manifestation 
alone does not reveal that criminals’ general attitude is worse than others’. 
 
2) Mill and the Interrelating Qualities of Electorate and Governance 
According to John Stuart Mill, the qualities of government are directly dependent 
on ‘the qualities of the human being composing the society over which the govern-
                                               
50 CP Manfredi, ‘In Defence of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) 
Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 259 at 270. 
51 Aristotle, ‘Politics’ (around 350 BC). 
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ment is exercised’.52 Defendants of limitation of felony franchise use this assump-
tion to justify infringements as compliant with democratic maxims.53 The crucial 
point in this conjunction is that the underlying reasoning, criminals were morally 
deteriorated seems to be a very broad generalisation. Additionally, defining certain 
‘qualities’ of citizens is a way too vague distinction that could easily be (ab)used to 
justify almost any kind of limitation (and discrimination) and would thus undermine 
the principle of electoral equality. 
 
3) The Need for a Closer Connection between Offence and Disenfranchisement 
Due to the shortcomings of the outlined approaches, I suggest to interpret the 
boundaries of possible limitations in a narrower way:  
When we acknowledge real universal suffrage, the unworthiness to participate in 
elections cannot simply arise from the general fact that the individual has broken 
the law; rather the measurement must be rationally connected with the offence, ie 
the concrete felonious breach itself must evidence a lack of respect for democratic 
institutions or elections. If not otherwise regulated by the constitution, felony disen-
franchisement should therefore only be imposed when the crime affects the election 
process itself. Indeed, this interpretation significantly reduces the scope of applica-
tion as only crimes like election fraud, bribery of voters and similar offences could 
readily lead to disenfranchisement. In addition to that, suffrage might also be re-
stricted in conjunction with criminal actions against the state or its institutions like 
eg espionage, sabotage or treason. The listing is not necessarily exclusive, but gives 
an impression of the required character of the offences. Besides, this approach does 
not only obviate inappropriate restrictions that undermine the legitimacy of democ-
ratic elections; rather it pursues a clear and legitimate penologic objective as disen-
franchisement as an additional sanction is linked to the committed offence. 
Recent court decisions confirm, that often a more individual appraisal of the com-
mitted offence is required to meet constitutional requirements: In the Sauvé deci-
sions, the Canadian Constitutional Court first struck down a ‘blanket ban’ on pris-
oners’ vote (Sauvé No 1) saying the underlying law was drawn too broadly and 
                                               
52 JS Mill, ‘Considerations on Representative Government’ (1861) at 11. 
53 CP Manfredi, ‘In Defence of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) 
Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 259 at 271-273. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
14 
 
failed to meet the proportionality test.54 After Canada had amended its legislation 
and thenceforward only disenfranchised prisoners who served a sentence of two 
years or more, the Court in Sauvé No 2 also declared the new legislation unconstitu-
tional. Referring critically to the variety of offences and offenders covered by the 
new prohibition it concluded the regulation still did not reveal a sufficient rationale 
connection between the imposed limitation and governmental objectives.55 
In any case, these guidelines only apply when national constitutions do not explic-
itly address and allow felony disenfranchisement. Hence, in the United States, chal-
lenges of felony franchise limitations remained mostly unsuccessful. For example, 
in the case of Richardson v Ramirez the Supreme Court referred to Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution and accordingly ruled that prisoner 
disenfranchisement is an explicit constitutional exception to the right to vote which 
is guaranteed elsewhere in the constitution. For this reason the court concluded that 
limitation clauses were appropriate as long as they did not contain discriminatory 
differentiations.56 
 
B) The Right to Vote as a Human Right 
Unlike the categorisation as a democratic right, the question whether the right to 
vote is also a human right cannot be answered as easily. The difficulties already 
start with the definition of human rights since there is a long standing controversy 
whether human rights are universal or culturally relative.57 For the following analy-
sis it is sufficient to take the most commonly accepted definition as a basis, accord-
ing to which human rights are ‘inalienable fundamental rights to which a person is 
inherently entitled simply because he or she is a human being’.58 
 
 
 
                                               
54 Sauvé v Canada (No 1), 2 SCR (1993) 43853 at 913. 
55 Sauvé v Canada (No 2), 3 SCR (2002) 519 at 39. 
56 Richardson v Ramirez, 418 US 24 (1974) at 56, 85-86. 
57 For an introduction to this controversy see eg J Donnerly ‘The Relative Universality of Human 
Rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights Quarterly 400. 
58 See M Sepúlveda et al, Human Rights Reference Handbook 3rd (2004). 
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I) Different Scopes of Human Rights 
Even on the basis of this definition, human rights can be interpreted in a narrower or 
in a wider way. This depends mostly on the question, whether one considers only 
‘direct’ human rights issues or also acknowledges rights that arise out of undisputed 
principles. For instance, John Rawls adheres to a narrow definition and limits ‘hu-
man rights’ to only very few fundamental rights, namely the right to life, to liberty, 
to property and to formal equality as defined by the rules of natural justice.59 Due to 
this restricted view, Rawls does not acknowledge the right to vote as a human 
right.60 
Although the right to vote does not arise from ‘simply being a human individual’ 
but in addition requires membership to a specific society,61 most legal academics 
today derive the nature of the right to vote as a quasi human right from other ac-
knowledged human rights principles like the freedom of (political) expression and 
the right to be held equal before the law.62 
 
II) Concretion of the Right to Vote according to International Human Rights 
Treaties 
The mere fact that the right to vote is also protected as a human right in the broader 
sense does not reveal much about the right’s scope of limitation because human 
rights are not absolute, too. However, human rights conventions, like the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) or the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) may help to define the range of protection. 
 
1) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
According to Article 25 of the ICCPR,  
                                               
59 J Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999) 65. 
60 See ibid as well as the analysis of T Campbell, ‘Workplace Free Speech as a Human Right’ Work-
ing Paper Number 2002/10 Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics (Melbourne / Canberra) 
at 8-9, available at http://www.cappe.edu.au/docs/working-papers/Campbell1.pdf [last accessed on 
03 November 2011]. 
61 Otherwise, in which election(s) should stateless persons be allowed to participate? 
62 N Mbodla, ‘Should Prisoners have a Right to Vote?’ (2002) 46 Journal of African Law 92 at 98. 
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‘[e]very citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinc-
tions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: [...] (b) To vote 
and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of 
the will of the electors.’ 
Although the Covenant generally guarantees ‘universal and equal suffrage’, the ex-
pression ‘without unreasonable restrictions’ implies that reasonable restrictions are 
permissible.63 The legislative history of the ICCPR’s Article 25 reveals that resi-
dency, mental capacity but also serving of a sentence were considered to be rational 
reasons for restrictions at the time of drafting.64 However, these standards are sub-
ject to ongoing debates: With regard to prisoners’ disenfranchisement, the UN Hu-
man Rights Committee (UNHRC), the monitoring body of the ICCPR, has de-
manded that in cases of suspensions of the right to vote, the time span of the sus-
pension had to be proportionate to the sentence and the offence.65 More recently, the 
UNHRC has even criticized the existing blanket ban on felony voting in the United 
Kingdom: 
‘The Committee is concerned at the State party’s maintenance of an old law that 
convicted prisoners may not exercise their right to vote. The Committee fails to 
discern the justification for such a practice in modern times, considering that it 
amounts to an additional punishment and that it does not contribute towards the 
prisoner's reformation and social rehabilitation, contrary to article 10, paragraph 
366, in conjunction with article 25 of the Covenant. The State party should recon-
sider its law depriving convicted prisoners of the right to vote.’67 
The statements of the UNHRC clearly illustrate the change of values regarding fel-
ony franchise. Although the avowal is still a bit vague, the newly demanded stan-
dards reveal that the ICCPR may well serve as a legal framework to challenge dis-
proportionately strict disenfranchisement laws in the near future68 and thus stipulate 
                                               
63 RL Nunn, ‘Lock them up and Throw away the Vote’ (2004-2005) 5 Chicago J Int’l Law 763 at 
775. 
64 See 138 Cong Rec S4781-01 (02 April 1992), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/civilres.html [last accessed on 04. November 2011]. 
65 United Nations, Comment by the Human Rights Committee, No 25(57) Annex V(1), UN Docu-
ment CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 at 5 (para 14). 
66 Article 10, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR states: ‘The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of 
prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation’. 
67 United Nations, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. CCPR/CO/73/UK; CCPR/CO/73/UKOT, 6 December 2001, 
para 10, available at 
http://www.humanrights.ky/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/HRCHOME/YOURRIGHTS/INTERNATIONAL/C
IVILANDPOLITICALRIGHTS/OBSERVATIONS4.PDF [Last accessed on 04 November 2011]. 
68 The First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR has established an individual complaints mechanism 
which may be a viable tool for prisoners to challenge such kind of legislation. 
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concrete boundaries of limitation from an international and human rights perspec-
tive.  
 
2) The European Convention on Human Rights 
Even more detailed standards than from the ICCPR can be derived from the ECHR. 
The Convention and its additional protocols, which set out the core principles and 
objectives of the Council of Europe (CoE), obligate the state parties to ‘hold free 
elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure 
the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.’69 
At first glance, this wording seems to be rather vague and one could doubt whether 
the article can serve as a viable basis to concretise rules for restrictions of felony 
franchise. However, the ECHR is effectively supervised by the ECtHR and the 
Court quite freely interprets the CoE’s basic documents. Thus, the court held that 
Article 3 of the First Protocol gives greater solemnity to the state parties’ commit-
ment to free elections and contained an obligation to take positive measures in order 
to ensure and guarantee a proper shape of universal suffrage.70 Again, individuals 
whose right to vote has been unduly limited by one of the state parties can address 
the Court in order to have reviewed the design of franchise laws. 
The possibility to exclude a certain range of criminal offenders from the electorate 
in order to protect the election process as a whole has been generally accepted by 
the ECtHR.71 However, in the case of Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2), the Court for 
the first time ruled on general and automatic disenfranchisement of convicted pris-
oners and established concrete guidelines for the reconcilability of disenfranchise-
ment laws and human rights:72  
                                               
69 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Arti-
cle 3, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/009.htm [last accessed 05. No-
vember 2011]. 
70 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (Application No 74025/01) (6 October 2005) European Court of 
Human Rights (Grand Chamber) at 57. The Principle of ‘universal suffrage’ is simply derived from 
the protocol’s wording ‘the people’. 
71 See eg Labita v Italy, (Application No 26772/95) (6 April 2000). 
72 Prisoners’ disenfranchisement has been codified in section 3 and 3A of the United Kingdom’s 
Representation of the People Act 1983, available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1983/2/section/3 [last accessed 05. November 2011]. 
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Analysing the relevancy of franchise, the ECtHR pointed out that the right to vote 
was not a privilege.73 Considering the history of franchise, the court demanded that 
presumptions in a democratic state had to be a favour of inclusion. As universal suf-
frage has become the basic principle, exceptions had to be well founded and bal-
anced.74 
With regard to the UK’s legislation, the Court recognised that the restrictions on 
felony franchise were shaped in an indiscriminate way as each and every prisoner 
was affected, notwithstanding the nature or gravity of the committed offence, the 
length of the sentence or any other criterion. However, the Court criticised the 
scope of disenfranchisement laws in place as they excluded more than 48,000 citi-
zens and thus potentially undermined the legitimacy of the electoral process.75  
The Chamber further pointed out that certain limitations may generally be imple-
mented as long as they are reasonably and appropriately adapted to a legitimate 
government aim.76 The UK’s government put forward that prisoners’ disenfran-
chisement served a number of such legitimate aims as it helped to prevent crime, 
enhance civil responsibility and deepen respect for the rule of law.77 Although the 
ECtHR did not consider these aims as fully coherent, it conceded a certain ‘ma-
noeuvring room’ to the legislator and did not strike down the government’s reason-
ing as per se incompatible with Article 3 of the First Protocol.78 Still it has been 
emphasised that restrictive felony franchise laws cannot be justified by any other 
goals stated in the Convention itself. Especially, it cannot be argued that prisoners’ 
disenfranchisement was required to uphold public safety or could serve as a viable 
tool to prevent crime.79  
All in all, the Court gave great weight to the principle of proportionality: According 
to its argumentation, any additional infringement of basic human rights guaranteed 
in the Convention must take into account the circumstances of the individual case 
                                               
73 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (Application No 74025/01) (6 October 2005) European Court of 
Human Rights (Grand Chamber) at 59. 
74 Ibid at 51-62. 
75 Ibid at 45. 
76 Ibid at 62. 
77 Ibid at 74. 
78 Ibid at 47. 
79 S Foster ‘Automatic Forfeiture of Fundamental Rights: Prisoners, Freedom of Expression and the 
Right to Vote’ (2007) 16 Nottingham LJ 1 at 20.  
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and weigh them carefully.80 Yet, there was no evidence that UK’s parliament had 
even tried to balance the competing interests and to assess the proportionality of the 
restrictions. To illustrate this fact, the Court pointed out that there were several 
equally anti-social crimes which would not entail disenfranchisement since no in-
carceration applied.81 Moreover, the UK’s blanket ban excluded the national courts 
from any proportionality analysis in the individual case. Implicitly, the Court’s rea-
soning shows that decisions about the limitation of prisoners’ franchise must be 
subject to a review by a judicial body in order to ensure that the legitimacy of elec-
tions is not undermined and that the single-case decision is proportionate.82 For the 
given reasons, the ECtHR did not confirm that the legislator’s choice to impose a 
blanket ban on felons’ franchise fell within the accepted margin of appreciation and 
consequently ruled that the UK’s legislation violated the Convention. 
The case of Hirst (No 2) illustrates very well that limitations of the right to vote 
may be acceptable as long as the actual implementation is based on an individual 
decision which weighs the gravity of the specific case and demonstrates a rational 
connection between the committed offence and the additional legal consequence.83 
Although it is the legislator’s duty to constitute a legal framework, the individual 
decision must be made or reviewed by the particular criminal court in order to en-
sure a proper proportionality analysis.84 
 
C) The Right to Vote as Part of the Human Dignity 
Apart from the influence of constitutional law and human rights law, the human 
dignity might be a third parameter to determine the shape of franchise laws. The 
human dignity can be described as somewhat like the most core human right. It is 
held by any human being and cannot at all be legally curtailed as no limitation can 
be justified.85  
                                               
80 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (Application No 74025/01) (2005) European Court of Human 
Rights (Grand Chamber) at 71. 
81 Ibid at 37. 
82 S Foster ‘Automatic Forfeiture of Fundamental Rights: Prisoners, Freedom of Expression and the 
Right to Vote’ (2007) 16 Nottingham LJ 1 at 20. 
83 Ibid at 21. 
84 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (Application No 74025/01) (2005) European Court of Human 
Rights (Grand Chamber) at 45. 
85 For an overview about the term’s development see eg D Richter, ‘Die Würde der Kreatur - 
Rechtsvergleichende Betrachtungen’ ZaöRV 2007, 319. 
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Some constitution’s basic rights charters are built on, ie centred around the human 
dignity. According to the German Grundgesetz for example, every ‘ordinary’ basic 
right contains a core which is reflective of the human dignity and makes this core 
indefeasible.86 Some legal academics have picked up this formation and argued, the 
right to vote likewise contained an indefeasible core which may not be legally cur-
tailed – however an exclusion of electors would not leave a single part of their fran-
chise behind and would thus violate the human dignity. The idea has mostly been 
developed in conjunction with demeny voting; however the arguments for the most 
part can analogously be considered in terms of felony disenfranchisement. 
The assertors of the human-dignity argument somehow adopt the idea of the social 
contract but put different emphasis on the rights and obligations: according to their 
view, the duties arising from this contract (ie to respect the law) can only be valid 
when each and everyone who is subordinated may also participate in the decision-
making process.87 Otherwise, the individual is only inflicted with duties without re-
ceiving compensating rights and thus becomes an ‘object of state action’ which in 
turn results in an infringement of the human dignity.88 
Although the right to vote is without any doubt an important expression of free self-
development and individual autonomy, the classification as part of the human dig-
nity is only a minority opinion. Most legal scholars instead hold that the participa-
tion in elections is not an essential prerequisite to compensate the duty to adhere to 
a state’s laws. Rather, the human dignity is effectively protected by the guarantee of 
remedies which allows every citizen who is subject to binding legal obligations to 
challenge them in court.89 Since recourse may be had by any citizen, including pris-
oners, disenfranchisement does not make prisoners an ‘object of state action’.  
 
 
                                               
86 M Herdegen, ‘Der Menschenwürdegehalt anderer Grundrechtsgarantien‘ in T Maunz and G Dürig 
(eds) Grundgesetz 61ed (2011) Art 1 mn 26-27. 
87 M Zuleeg, AusländerR und Ausländerpolitik in Europa (1987) 153-154. 
88 http://www.national-
coalition.de/pdf/stellungnahmen/Diskussionspapier%20NC%20Wahlrecht.pdf at 3 [last accessed on 
11 November 2011]. 
89 K Nopper, Minderjährigenwahlrecht - Hirngespinst oder Verfassungsrechtliches Gebot in einer 
Grundlegend Gewandelten Gesellschaft? (1999) 109; C Knödler, ‘Wahlrecht für Minderjährige – 
eine gute Wahl?’ ZParl 27 (1996), 553 at 559-561. 
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D) Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated some requirements which felony franchise laws have to 
meet in order to conform to standards of constitutional and human rights law. In a 
broad sense, constitutional and human rights principles alone can hardly define con-
crete boundaries for limitations of prisoners’ right to vote. However, the analysis 
has shown that in conjunction with concretising legislation, be it national constitu-
tions or international human rights treaties, the principles may well determine con-
crete preconditions for restrictions of franchise law. In concrete, constitutional re-
quirements for democratic elections mostly demand a rationale connection between 
the concrete felonious breach and the legal consequence of disenfranchisement. 
Human rights treaties generally focus rather on the upholding of democratic princi-
ples in order to ensure the equality of the election process. The plurality of sources 
is important as human rights treaties are not exclusively subject to national freedom 
of scope and thus may guarantee electoral rights on a broader fundament. In any 
case, the concrete permissibility of franchise limitations cannot be evaluated with-
out considering the impact of these regulations on the individual as well as on soci-
ety as a whole.  
 
CHAPTER III: DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AN INDIVIDUAL CONTEXT 
Having depicted the frame of the democratic electoral process, historically as well 
as in terms of constitutional and human rights principles, the following chapter 
seeks to analyse the effects of disenfranchisement on the individual person ie the 
prisoner. Thereafter, Chapter IV will highlight the influence on the democratic sys-
tem and society as a whole. This differentiation between individual and social im-
pact is useful since the measurement pursues independent goals among each sphere. 
Thus, the classification helps to develop a better structured argumentation and a 
more focused analysis. Some aspects (like eg the inclusive function of franchise) af-
fect both spheres and have to be considered according to their main focus or subdi-
vided into more specific aspects. However, I am convinced that the analytic percep-
tion of this approach by far outbalances the drawbacks. 
When one seeks to evaluate the individual impact of a measurement, it is best to 
start with the objectives. Therefore, the initial question will be whether disenfran-
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chisement aims to be an additional form of punishment or if it is rather a merely 
regulatory measurement. Next, four rationales which are generally named in con-
junction with disenfranchisement will be critically analysed. Finally I will conclude 
if franchise limitations may generally – or at least in specific cases – help to achieve 
the intended goals.  
 
A) Restrictions on Felony Franchise: Really a Form of Additional Punishment 
or Simply a Regulatory Measurement? 
The question whether disenfranchisement is of a predominantly punitive or regula-
tory character has been discussed long and excessively.90 In the US, disenfran-
chisement is only one of numerous ‘collateral sanctions’ or ‘collateral conse-
quences’ that are imposed on offenders. Other measures – depending on the particu-
lar state – may be the exclusion from civil service, restrictions on the possession of 
firearms or registration and notification requirements. Although all these actions 
contain burdens for the offender, they are often not considered to be an additional 
form of punishment because their ostensible goals are of civil and regulatory nature. 
As the accompanying punitive character is qualified rather as a side effect, eg the 
US judiciary does not apply the same high standards regarding proportionality and 
justification.91 
Although the US are generally a ‘tough-on-crime country’, many of these ‘collateral 
consequences’ – and especially the practice of disenfranchisement – do not fit prop-
erly into the system of existing penal sanctions.92 The act of imposition is legally 
separated from the actual criminal sentence, even though it is factually attached to 
it:93 Different to a prison sentence or a fine, disenfranchisement is not explicitly im-
posed, ie mentioned in the verdict; it rather is an automatic consequence from the 
                                               
90 See A Ewald and B Rottinghaus ‘Introduction’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Dis-
enfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 1 at 12-13. 
91 Simmons v Galvin, USDC Mass, 30 August 2007, 12, 37 available at 
http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?page=1&xmldoc=2007735652kfsupp2d83_1725.xml&docba
se=CSLWAR3-2007-CURR&SizeDisp=7 [last accessed on 21 November 2011]. 
92 NV Demleitner, ‘Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon Dis-
enfranchisement as an Alternative’ (1999/2000) 84 Minnesota LR, 753 at 755. 
93 M Pinard, ‘Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral Consequences and Reentry 
into Criminal Defence Lawyering’ (2004) 31 Fordham Urban LJ 1067 at 1074. 
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prison sentence.94 This is somehow crucial, as many defendants, prosecutors and 
even judges do not even know about the additional legal consequence.95 Anyway, 
the peculiar separation allows asserters of disenfranchisement to avoid the categori-
sation of the measure as a form of punishment, although the punitive effects are 
hardly deniable.96 
Among many other legal cultures, especially those based on civil law, restrictions 
on felony franchise are an acknowledged punitive measurement. In Germany, for 
example, it can already be derived from the statutory position of Art 45 para 5 of 
the Strafgesetzbuch (as part of ‘Erster Titel – Strafen’97) that the deprivation of 
franchise is a punitive measurement.98 
Although the nature of disenfranchisement is defined unequally among different le-
gal cultures, this merely terminological issue should not impair the requirements 
which a restrictive public measurement – whatever its name may be – must achieve. 
Otherwise, national governments could easily avoid requirements defined by the ju-
diciary (eg national constitutional courts) by redefining the imposed measurement. 
Since name and nature of franchise limitation are not of specific importance for the 
individual addressee, it is reasonable to apply universal standards. At the most, dis-
enfranchisement must be considered to be of ‘potential[ly] hybrid nature’99 and thus 
has to meet the objectives of punitive measures. 
 
B) Disenfranchisement and the Objectives of Punitive Measures  
The purposes ascribed to punitive measures are manifold, partly in flux and de-
pendent on a society’s legal culture. Still, four more or less universal objectives are 
                                               
94 NV Demleitner, ‘U.S. Felon disenfranchisement: Parting Ways with Western Europe’ in A Ewald 
and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 79 at 
82. 
95 American Bar Association, ‘Standards for Criminal Justice, Collateral Sanctions and Discrimina-
tory Disqualification of Convicted Persons‘ 3ed (2004). 
96 A Ewald, ‘The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement Law in the United States’ 
(2002) 5 Wisconsin LR 1045 at 1057; NV Demleitner, ‘Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Soci-
ety: The German Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative’ (1999/2000) 84 Minnesota 
LR, 753. 
97 Chapter One - Punitive Measures. 
98 See also NV Demleitner, ‘Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of 
Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative’ (1999/2000) 84 Minnesota LR, 753 at 757. 
99 Simmons v Galvin, USDC Mass, 30 August 2007, available at 
http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?page=1&xmldoc=2007735652kfsupp2d83_1725.xml&docba
se=CSLWAR3-2007-CURR&SizeDisp=7 [last accessed on 21 November 2011]. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
24 
 
frequently cited, in general as well as in conjunction with prisoners’ disenfran-
chisement: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation, the last one of-
ten named is conjunction with reintegration and education.100 
 
I) Retribution 
The basic idea of retribution is that the criminal offender has executed power of 
mastery over the victim and law has to assert something in response in order to ex-
press society’s moral disapproval and to ‘equalise’ the offence.101 While this princi-
ple has already been outlined in the Bible (‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’)102 
and was widely practiced throughout the Middle Ages (see Chapter I above), mod-
ern democracies usually refrain from ‘violent sanctions’. Instead, fines and incar-
ceration have become the standard forms of retribution, but they are by no means 
the only options. Generally, retribution can be achieved by any reaction which puts 
a sanction on the culprit and is socially acknowledged as an adequate measurement. 
The nature of the punitive measure does not have to be akin to the felonious offence 
– and in many cases it even must not be akin to it.103  
In terms of franchise restrictions, the criminal offence is often considered to be a 
breach of the social contract which may justify the exclusion of the offender from 
the participation process – permanently or at least for a certain period of time. This 
reasoning is particularly demonstrative during the actual time of incarceration: the 
removal from society goes hand in hand with the removal from the privileges of so-
ciety.104 However, this idea is closely related to the outdated concept of ‘civil 
death’105 and especially the continuing disenfranchisement after release (which is 
widespread in the US) illustrates the shaming character of the measurement which 
                                               
100 TJ Miles, ‘Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout’ (2004) 33 J Legal Stud 84 at 118. 
101 CP Manfredi, ‘In Defence of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) 
Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 259 at 274. 
102 Exodus 21 : 23-25. 
103 Having eg a rapist raped on behalf of public penal authorities would gravely violate the culprit’s 
human dignity. 
104 See NV Demleitner, ‘U.S. Felon disenfranchisement: Parting Ways with Western Europe’ in A 
Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 
79 at 100. 
105 S Easton, ‘Electing the Electorate: The Problem of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ (2006) 69 Mod-
ern LR 443 at 449. For details about the concept see the historical outline above (Chapter I). 
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permanently disallows criminals to gain back their full standing in society.106 Due 
to these drawbacks and in order to better achieve penologic goals, recent court deci-
sions have demanded for a ‘close connection’ between the actual offence and the re-
tributive measure: The Supreme Court of Canada in its Sauvé (No 2) decision 
adopted107 a definition, according to which: 
[r]etribution in a criminal context [...] represents an objective, reasoned and meas-
ured determination of an appropriate punishment which properly reflects the moral 
culpability of the offender, having regard to the intentional risk-taking of the of-
fender, the consequential harm caused by the offender, and the normative character 
of the offender’s conduct.108 
On the basis of this definition, the court found that disenfranchisement had to be 
shaped much more individually in order to meet the requirements of denunciatory, 
retributive punishment. Therefore, a ‘blanket ban’ that does not consider the charac-
ter and effect of the committed crime – just like repetitively demanded by asserters, 
who imprecisely refer to a breach of the social contract – cannot meet the penologic 
requirements of retribution and was thus declared unconstitutional under Canadian 
law.109 
To sum up, felony disenfranchisement is not generally uneligible to fulfil the pur-
pose of retribution but has to be rationally connected to the concrete offence and 
proportional. 
 
II) Deterrence 
The penological goal of deterrence is twofold: firstly, deterrence may preventively 
encourage any potential offender to adhere to the law (general prevention). Sec-
ondly, it may discipline a convicted offender in order to obviate future misconduct 
(specific deterrence).  
Effective general prevention requires the thread with a punitive measure which is 
severe enough to deter the individual from a contemplated offence. It is already 
                                               
106 See NV Demleitner, ‘U.S. Felon disenfranchisement: Parting Ways with Western Europe’ in A 
Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 
79 at 82. 
107 Originally given by JAC Lamer in R. v. M. (C.A.), 1 SCR (1996) 500 at 80. 
108 Sauvé v Canada (No 2), 3 SCR (2002) 519 at 50. 
109 Ibid at 51. 
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doubtful, whether franchise restrictions may constitute such a threat because the 
sanction is – as outlined above – widely unknown. But even if the measurement was 
well-known, its prospects of successful prevention were probably limited: Criminal 
offences are typically punished with fines or imprisonment. It is quite unlikely that 
(potential) criminals give more weight to the right to vote than to other benefits like 
liberty or money, which are already endangered through the commitment of a 
crime.110 
Also in terms of specific deterrence, it is questionable whether the franchise is of 
sufficient importance for prisoners to create a significant effect. The issues of com-
plaints received by human rights organisations from prisoners show that the right to 
vote is not among prisoners’ most pressing concerns.111 This is probably different 
with prisoners whose felonious breach is connected with the electoral process, be-
cause the nature of the offence gives an indication for the importance, these persons 
ascribe to political participation. If disenfranchisement is used as a measurement of 
(additional) punishment, it should therefore be tagged to specific election-related 
crimes in order to emphasise the context with the violation.112 Especially with re-
gard to politically interested criminals, the symbolic effect, ie that prisoners feel 
ashamed and excluded from society, must not be underestimated: this effect can 
even be amplified when the promulgation is publicly declared in conjunction with 
the sentence.113  
In any case, specific deterrence can only be successful when prisoners retrieve their 
right to vote after release or after a fixed period of time: If culprits know that they 
will not be able to regain their franchise anyway, the measure may not serve as an 
incentive for future law-obedience.114 Except from the temporary imposition regard-
                                               
110 See NV Demleitner, ‘U.S. Felon disenfranchisement: Parting Ways with Western Europe’ in A 
wald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 
79 at 100. 
111 R Redman et at, ‘The Politics and Legality of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ in Disenfranchise-
ment’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Per-
spective (2009) 167 at 182. 
112 NV Demleitner, ‘U.S. Felon disenfranchisement: Parting Ways with Western Europe’ in A Ewald 
and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 79 at 
104. 
113 Ibid at 100. 
114 P Gendreau et al, ‘The Effect of Prison Sentences on Recidivism’ (1999) Public Works and Gov-
ernment Services, Canada. 
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ing election-related offences it is very unlikely that disenfranchisement may deter 
offenders, anyway.115 
 
III) Incapacitation 
The idea of incapacitation is of great importance for penology and especially in 
terms of violent crimes often considered to be most effective in order to protect so-
ciety from future crimes. However, incapacitation is for the most part achieved 
through incarceration and disenfranchisement can only contribute little to support 
the effect. In fact, restrictions of felony franchise can only incapacitate future of-
fences which are directly related to the electoral process and connected with the 
felon’s own vote. Ultimately, the only criminal offence which may be prevented is 
the ‘selling of votes’.116 During the actual incarceration, this goal is already 
achieved through the controlled election process in prison. Hence, incapacitation 
through disenfranchisement can only be achieved when it is imposed after release.  
 
IV) Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Education 
While in former times, punishment served primarily the purpose of retribution, de-
terrence and – in cases of imprisonment or capital punishment – incapacitation, 
modern correctional law gives greater weight to rehabilitation, reintegration and 
education.117 Throughout the last decades, several judicial bodies have declared that 
capital punishment and/or lifelong imprisonment violates principles of constitu-
tional or human rights law.118 Quite literally they stated: Everyone deserves a sec-
ond chance. This new prevailing case law encouraged many legislators to initiate a 
paradigm shift in the field of penologic goals. In Germany, for instance, the adjust-
ment of penal provisions took place in the late 1960s and the 1970s. At that time, 
the retributive Zuchthaus was abolished and replaced by a more reintegrative prison 
                                               
115 C Hamilton and R Lines, ‘The Campaign for Prisoner Voting Rights in Ireland’ in A Ewald and B 
Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 205 at 213. 
116 This offence is likely to happen with postal votes and criminalised in many countries, see eg Art 
108e para 1 of the German Criminal Code. 
117 Cf the historical outline in this work’s Chapter I. 
118 For example, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht stated in 1977 that the human dignity guar-
anteed a second chance even after the commitment of most serious crimes like murder (BVerfGE 45, 
187). 
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regime.119 Today, rehabilitation and reintegration have become the primary objec-
tives of penalisation. Still, they must not always prevail, as they may have a coun-
terproductive effect on other objectives: in order to be retributive and deterrent, in-
carceration must also be unpleasant – an effect that first and foremost is caused by 
exclusion. Therefore, penological goals must be weight carefully in due considera-
tion of the individual offence.  
 
1) The Momentousness of Exclusion 
The treatment of offenders during and in the aftermath of their incarceration has 
great influence on the individual’s attitude towards society. As outlines above in 
conjunction with the goal of retribution, the most ostensible effect of disenfran-
chisement is its symbolic demonstration of exclusion. Critics argue the measure-
ment signaled that whatever the prisoners say was not of interest to ‘those at the 
top’ and that society had lost any interest in prisoners’ destiny: as soon as culprits 
were out of sight, they were out of ordinary people’s mind.120 Moreover, it makes it 
impossible for offenders to demonstrate their democratic credibility. These argu-
ments cannot be dismissed, as the right to vote is the only remaining possibility for 
prisoners to execute political rights – due to their incarceration, they are already 
stripped of the right to attend demonstrations (freedom of assembly) or to imple-
ment and participate in associations. Since the casting of one’s vote is also an im-
portant way of self-expression, disenfranchisement does not only affect the democ-
ratic decision making process; felons are also personally excluded from political 
dialogue and deprived of their political voice.121  
 
 
 
                                               
119 C Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil Band I: Grundlagen - Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre 
4ed (2005) 87. 
120 See B Collins, Justice Action, Evidence in the Finance and Public Administration Legislation 
Committee: Electoral and Referendum Amendment (Electoral Integrity and other Measures) Bill 
2005, 7 March 2006, 4 available at http://parlinfoweb.aph.gov.au [last accessed on 16. November 
2011]. 
121 Sauvé v Canada (No 2), 3 SCR (2002) 519 at 60. 
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2) Participation Encouraging Prisoners to Mend their Ways? 
Among legal academics, there is broad consensus that disenfranchisement does not 
foster the rehabilitation of offenders.122 Rather, the opposite is true: disenfranchise-
ment seems to inhibit reintegration and may even lead to an increase in recidivism 
among excluded offenders after release: Studies of US sociologists have revealed 
that citizens who participate in elections are less likely to commit criminal offences 
and to be arrested and sentenced to imprisonment.123 Since the result might also be 
caused by different factors (like eg a correlation between education or social back-
ground and law-abidance) the finding does not necessarily proof that political par-
ticipation is a cause of desistance from crime. However, experiences in countries 
that do not disenfranchise prisoners show that felons who actually participate in 
elections are more likely to reintegrate successfully into their communities.124 Ug-
gen and Manza could even prove in a study, published in 2004,125 that active voters 
in the 1996 election were significantly less likely to be rearrested than nonvoters: 
while only 5 per cent of voters were rearrested, the relapse rate among nonvoters 
was more than three times as high (16 per cent).126  
This shows that political interest and participation are generally connected with a 
law-abiding entity and that it is worth to teach felons social responsibility and de-
mocratic values.127 Already the opportunity to vote contributes to prisoners’ rehabil-
itation, notwithstanding if the right is finally used or not: The mere act of inviting 
prisoners to participate is of important symbolic value.128 Anyway, practical experi-
ences with elections in prisons show that once the opportunity to vote is granted it is 
frequently used: According to a Danish prison report,129 61 per cent of the prison 
                                               
122 NV Demleitner ‘Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon 
Disenfranchisement as an Alternative’ (1999/2000) 84 Minnesota LR, 753 at 785. 
123 CA Visher and J Travis, ‘Transition from Prison to Community: Understanding Individual Path-
ways’ (2003) 29 Annual Review of Sociology 89-113. 
124 Ibid. 
125 The time from 1997 to 2000 being the observation period. 
126 C Uggen and J Manza, ‘Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence from a Community 
Sample’ (2004) 36 Columbia Human Rights LR 193.  
127 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (Application No 74025/01) (6 October 2005) European Court of 
Human Rights (Grand Chamber) at 26, 42-43, 46. 
128 This gain is eg not acknowledged by TJ Miles, who states, the right to vote was meaningless for 
non-voters und could therefore not enhance the rehabilitation of politically indifferent ex-felons, see 
‘Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout’ (2004) 33 J Legal Stud 85 at 119. 
129According to Danish law, no additional sanctions affecting participation rights may be imposed on 
offenders during sanction enforcement, ie prisoners have an unlimited right to vote. 
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inmates participated in national elections.130 The great acceptance might arise from 
the convenience of voting – prisoners’ polling place is literally in front of their cell 
door – and the fact that the electoral act itself is a welcome break from routine.131 
 
3) International Law and Recent Court Decisions 
The negative impact of disenfranchisement on the individual’s reintegration is also 
crucial with regard to international law: according to the UN Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, imprisonment should not emphasise the cul-
prits’ exclusion but rather ensure participation in the community.132 Additionally, 
the UN Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners demand the creation of fa-
vourable conditions for the reintegration into society after release.133  
Recent court decisions have emphasised the importance of inclusion, too: In Sauvé 
(No 2), the Canadian Constitutional Court criticised, disenfranchisement did not 
state a clear lesson and the educative message was, at best, a mixed and diffuse 
one.134 Instead, the exclusion clearly undermined the goal of rehabilitation and re-
integration and thus was ‘bad pedagogy’.135 
The ECtHR also addressed the question of education in its Hirst (No 2) decision and 
demanded a tighter connection between the individual circumstances of the feloni-
ous breach and the imposed sanction in order to fulfil the requirements of propor-
tionality and to deliver a clearer message.136 The Court concluded that if this ‘ra-
tional connection’ was established, the limitations of franchise might generally 
comply with the requirements of the ECHR and its additional protocols.137 
 
                                               
130 See A Storgaard, ‘The Right to Vote in Danish Prisons’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) 
Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 244 at 253. 
131 C Gallagher, ‘The Captive Vote: Prisoners’ Suffrage in Ireland’, (2001) 1 University College 
Dublin LR 1 at 19. 
132 Rule Nr. 61, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/treatmentprisoners.htm [last ac-
cessed on 18 November 2011]. 
133 See Principle 10, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/basicprinciples.htm [last ac-
cessed on 18 November 2011].  
133 Ibid. 
134 Sauvé v Canada (No 2), 3 SCR (2002) 519 at 39. 
135 Ibid at 30. 
136 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (Application No 74025/01) (6 October 2005) European Court of 
Human Rights (Grand Chamber) at 36-37. 
137 Ibid at 51.  
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C) Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the classical principles of penology should also serve as 
a rule for the promulgation of franchise limitations. Although the impact of disen-
franchisement on the individual is predominantly of symbolic nature as it empha-
sises the convict’s exclusion from society, the measurement is nonetheless a severe 
sanction.  
Disenfranchisement sends out a strong signal, but its benefits remain small: from 
the classical penological goals, it can at best achieve some additional retribution. 
With regard to deterrence and incapacitation a blanket ban on prisoners’ franchise 
has only limited effects; in terms of rehabilitation, reintegration and education the 
measurement even proves to be counterproductive.  
The evaluation is different, when the committed felony is linked to the election 
process: in these cases, disenfranchisement may serve as a coherent measurement to 
deter offenders preventively or to provide an educative message after the offence. 
This is somehow parallel to the revocation of a driving licence in conjunction with 
serious traffic offences – a measure that is also not used without connectivity. 
 
CHAPTER IV: THE IMPACT OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT ON SOCIETY AND DEMOC-
RACY AS A WHOLE 
Different to most other penal sanctions, the effects of disenfranchisement are not 
limited to the individual addressee. First and foremost, franchise limitations of pris-
oners and ex-offenders may sway the result of elections. Moreover, the outcome of 
political debates and decisions may be influenced since there is usually paid less at-
tention to the interests of those who are excluded from participation anyway. For 
these reasons, the ECtHR has recently warned in its Hirst (No 2) decision that ex-
tensive franchise restrictions affect the equality and fairness of elections and 
threaten to undermine the democratic system as a whole.138 
In the following, I will try to analyse whether, and if so to what extent, disenfran-
chisement causes a distortion of the election result. In this regard, racial and social-
                                               
138 Ibid at 36. 
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economic characteristics of prisoners will be evaluated and compared to those of 
specific voting blocs’ supporters.  
Thereafter, the analysis will focus on the measure’s effects on political contents: 
Citizens who have been in touch with the criminal code generally have more 
knowledge about the field of criminal law. Also in terms of prison regime, the par-
ticipation of persons who are actually affected may help to advance public dis-
course. With the exclusion of prisoners from political participation and discussion, 
does society not deprive itself of valuable first-hand input?  
Finally, I will also consider the arguments brought forward by defendants of felony 
disenfranchisement. From their point of view, elections are not only a functional in-
strument but also a democracy’s sanctuary and the perpetuation of the ritual’s repu-
tation may well require the exclusion of dishonourable citizens. Furthermore, it is 
worth to discuss, whether a sovereign community should not have an opportunity to 
define its own identity by limiting some people’s participation rights. 
 
A) Disenfranchisement as a Distortion of the Election Result 
Any regulation of franchise may potentially influence the composition of the 
elected government: An adjustment of the general voting age will affect the influ-
ence of juveniles or young adults; granting permanent residents without citizenship 
the right to vote may have an impact on integration policy, etc. While there do exist 
comparable standards for almost all common restrictions of franchise, disenfran-
chisement of prisoners is regulated in a very diverging way and sometimes laws are 
even different among one and the same country. The wide margin of discretion 
makes the issue prone to political self-serving interests: whoever expects advan-
tages from stricter restrictions, personally or in terms of the own party, may feel en-
couraged to tighten disenfranchisement laws.  
The presidential election of 2000 in the United States is frequently cited to demon-
strate the practical impact of disenfranchisement: At the end of the day, this election 
was decided by only 527 votes in Florida while at the same time about 500,000 Flo-
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ridians were excluded due to post-sentence disenfranchisement.139 The widespread 
blanket disenfranchisement of (ex-) offenders in the US affects approximately two 
per cent of the whole mature population.140 Due to this huge number of persons 
concerned, the automatic implementation, like in the US is much more problematic 
than the purposefully and narrowly targeted practice among some of the (continen-
tal) European countries.141 Not only does the sheer number of exclusions pose a 
threat to the legitimacy of democratic elections. The problem is rather that prisoners 
are not drawn randomly from among the entire population: some categories of citi-
zens are significantly over-, others underrepresented.142 
In any case, countries which practice disenfranchisement in an excessive way must 
be aware of legal jeopardy: In the aftermath of the ECtHR’s Hirst (No 2) decision, 
which struck down the British franchise limitation laws, commentators warned the 
United Kingdom, a future election could be invalid under European law if the elec-
toral law was not adjusted in time according to the Court’s demands.143 
 
I) Disproportionate Racial Origins and the Ramifications on the Outcome of 
Elections 
1) Disenfranchisement Disproportionately affecting Racial and Ethnic Minori-
ties 
A 1998 study by Human Rights Watch outlined the heavy impact of felony fran-
chise limitatio s on ethnic and racial minority groups in countries with a mixed eth-
nicity.144 In the United States, for example, African Americans and Latinos today 
make up about 50 per cent of the convicted offenders who are stripped off the right 
                                               
139 J Manza and C Uggen, ‘Punishment and Democracy: Disenfranchisement of Nonincarcerated 
Felons in the United States’ (2004) 2 Perspectives on Politics 491 at 498. 
140 RL Nunn, ‘Lock them up and Throw away the Vote’ (2004-2005) 5 Chicago J Int’l Law 763 at 
764. 
141 L Ispahani, ‘Voting Rights and Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Criminal Disenfran-
chisement Laws’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an Interna-
tional Perspective (2009) 25 at 32. 
142 J Manza, ‘Foreword: Waves of Democracy and Criminal Disenfranchisement’ in A Ewald and B 
Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) xi at xii. 
143 J Doward, ‘Ban on Votes for Prisoners is Illegal, says Parliamentary Committee’ The Guardian 9 
November 2008, 5. 
144 J Fellner and M Mauer, ‘Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the 
United States’ (1998) 2, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/vote [last accessed on 16 October 
2011]. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
34 
 
to vote.145 In some US states like Alabama or Florida the quota of mature black 
males that has already lost franchise is about one third of the total share with a ten-
dency to rise even further.146 Throughout the whole United States, and also among 
most other nations,147 racial minorities are disproportionately affected by felony 
disenfranchisement.148 This is especially crucial as many racial minorities consist of 
immigrants and individuals often had a long way to go until they ultimately got the 
right to vote. Moreover, those individuals who have finally been granted franchise 
mostly represent a disproportionally big share of the total minority residents and 
thus are of particular importance for these groups’ articulation. 
 
2) The Electorate’s Ethnic Composition Determining the Outcome of Elections 
Damian J Martinez has analysed in 2004 that not only Blacks but also Latinos are 
disproportionally disadvantaged by franchise limitations, since this group is signifi-
cantly overrepresented among the incarcerated population (18,1 per cent) in com-
parison to a rate of 13 per cent among the national population.149 Moreover, Marti-
nez has done detailed research on the voting preferences of Latino subgroups in the 
US and found out that most of the Mexican and Puerto Rican immigrants have a 
clear preference for the Democrats, while among the Latinos from Cuban decent 
there is a preference for the Republican Party. 150 In sum, however, Latinos – just 
like black Americans – tend to vote rather for the Democratic Party and thus, disen-
franchisement factually puts this camp on a disadvantage. This distortive effect was 
one of the core criticisms with regard to the narrow election result in Florida, 2000. 
Anyway, parallel observations can also be made among many other nations: racial 
minorities, immigrants and indigenous groups alike, generally tend to vote for a left 
                                               
145 RL Nunn, ‘Lock them up and Throw away the Vote’ (2004-2005) 5 Chicago J Int’l Law 763 at 
768. 
146 J Fellner and M Mauer, ‘Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the 
United States’ (1998) 1, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/vote [last accessed on 16 October 
2011]. 
147 Similar problems exist(ed) especially in countries with an aboriginal population, such as Australia 
or Canada. 
148 T Dugree-Pearson, ‘Disenfranchisement: A Race Neutral Punishment for Felony Offenders or a 
Way to Diminish the Minority Vote?’ (2002) 23 Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy, 359 at 
364. 
149 DJ Martinez, ‘Felony Disenfranchisement and Voting Participation: Considerations in Latino Ex-
Prisoner Reentry’ (2004/2005) 36 Columbia Human Rights LR 217 at 221.  
150 Ibid at 236. 
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wing government.151 Therefore, disenfranchisement can by no means be seen as a 
symbolic act; rather the practical consequences are significant and may, like the US 
presidential election 2000 exemplifies, even decide about the final results of elec-
tions. 
 
3) Racial Imbalance: an Unintended Side-effect or Purposeful Discrimination?   
Politicians in defence of disenfranchisement have repetitively pointed out that the 
cluster of ethnic minorities affected was not the result of a racist policy but simply 
of the individual felonious convictions and that the measurement by no means in-
tended to put minorities at a disadvantage. Recalling the history of felony franchise 
laws, one has to admit that former discriminatory differentiations (see this work’s 
Chapter I) have widely been eliminated and that a blanket ban or the linkage to a 
certain term of imprisonment per se does not reveal discriminatory purposes.    
In 2001, however, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) expressed its concerns about the design and the extent of disenfranchise-
ment laws in the United States. In concrete, the Committee addressed the ‘large 
segment of the ethnic minority population’ and criticised the permanence of the 
measure which ‘prevent[s felons] from voting even after the completion of their 
sentences’.152 From an objective point of view, this statement is quite surprising be-
cause it is acknowledged that the CERD does not encompass indirect discrimina-
tion: When a law chooses criteria for the diverging treatment of an issue and these 
criteria are not readily related to race, colour of skin or ethnicity, a successful chal-
lenge of the particular regulation requires the proof that discrimination was in real-
ity the underlying purpose. An adverse impact on a specific minority group is gen-
erally not considered to be sufficient.153 
Also in terms of national law, intentional racial discrimination would be unconstitu-
tional under quasi all jurisdictions. In the United States, for instance, the Equal Pro-
                                               
151 See eg A Harell and D Panagos, ‘Locating the Aboriginal Gender Gap: The Political Preferences 
and Participation of Aboriginal Women in Canada’ available at http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-
2010/Harell-Panagos.pdf [last accessed on 01 December 2012] at 13. 
152 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United 
States of America, 14 August 2001, para 397, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/A.56.18,paras.380-407.En?Opendocument [last 
accessed on 25 November 2011]. 
153 See eg Western Australia v Ward (2002) HCA, 191 ALR 1 at para 659. 
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tection Clause, a part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution, has al-
ready been used several times as a basis to challenge felony franchise laws in terms 
of their disproportionate racial effects.154 Yet, whenever trial courts acknowledged a 
discriminatory shape of laws, follow-up rulings by the courts of appeals struck 
down these findings.155 
The Canadian Supreme Court, in contrast, explicitly considered the disproportion-
ally high number of prisoners from aboriginal descent in its second Sauvé decision: 
Although the Court did not raise the question whether the racial imbalance was 
caused purposefully, it emphasised that the factual pattern sent out a silent message 
which can deepen the racial conflicts already smouldering in the country.156 Some 
commentators even reason, this was one major motive for the court to declare the 
franchise legislation unconstitutional.157 
Taking everything into account, one must acknowledge that disenfranchisement 
most seriously affects ethnic minorities. Although this imbalance is – under prevail-
ing opinion – not established or upheld purposefully, it is nonetheless problematic 
in terms of the protection of minority rights and the overall goal of inclusion. Due to 
these findings, it is incomprehensible when eg Manfredi claims, disenfranchisement 
was not used to exclude significant sections of the population.158 Especially with 
regard to the US (but also in terms of the UK), the number of disenfranchised felons 
is big enough to be decisive for the election result. 
 
II) The Influence of Social Class on Voting Behaviour 
For a long time, the right to vote was only granted to property-owners or required 
other proof of wealth.159 Therefore, the implementation of equal suffrage was one of 
the biggest achievements in the history of democracy.160 Due to this long and ardu-
                                               
154 WW Liles, ‘Challenges to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws: Past, Present, and Future’ (2006-
2007) 58 Alabama LR 615 at 620. 
155 See eg Williams v. Taylor 677 F2d 510 (5th Circuit 1982).  
156 Sauvé v Canada (No 2), 3 SCR (2002) 519 at 60. 
157 Ibid at 14, 15, 60 and 68. 
158 CP Manfredi, ‘In Defence of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) 
Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 259 at 273. 
159 See eg R Briffault, ‘The Contested Right to Vote’ (2002) 100 Michigan LR 1506 at 1509. 
160 See also this work’s Chapter I (History and Development) above. 
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ous development, legal theorists today call for high vigilance whenever franchise 
restrictions may affect social equality. 
Felony disenfranchisement is one of very few measurements that may potentially 
endanger the equality of suffrage and put the lower class at a disadvantage. It is a 
general truism that a large amount of crimes is caused or advanced by the precari-
ous environment of the offenders. This, of course, applies to offences against prop-
erty, but is also a prevalent motive for many violent crimes, drug offences, etc. 
Therefore, socially underprivileged persons are significantly overrepresented among 
prison inmates.161 In countries which practice disenfranchisement of ex-offenders, 
this effect is even increased: Most offences against property are punished less se-
verely than capital crimes. Although the commitment of ‘petty offences’ like eg 
shoplifting, usually ‘only’ results in a fine or a short term of incarceration, the of-
fenders are often banned from voting for their whole life. Thus, the share of under-
privileged persons among prisoners does not even mirror the share among disen-
franchised people.  
Additionally, less severe offences against property are often committed in younger 
days. In these cases, the lifelong limitation of suffrage does not only thwart reinte-
gration; it also has a deeper and more lasting impact as the disenfranchisement of 
young culprits has an effect on a greater number of elections. 
On the basis of the finding that disenfranchisement disproportionally affects so-
cially underprivileged citizens, it is worth analysing if this imbalance also has an ef-
fect on the outcome of elections. Stripping a socially underprivileged group of their 
right to vote is a highly symbolic act as it extends the already existing exclusion due 
to financial restraints to participation in issues of the community. This is especially 
crucial since it may cause the feeling of being dominated by ‘the establishment’. 
This would especially be the case if poorer people had a different voting preference 
than average citizens.  
On the one hand, poor people are much more dependent on the welfare system than 
wealthy people are. On the other hand, they usually do not care as much about is-
sues like taxation, because their low income often does not make them liable to tax 
                                               
161 A holistic analysis of this phenomenon is presented by U Spiegel and A Templeman, ‘Economics 
of Discriminatory Sentencing’ (1989) 5 Journal of Quantitative Criminology 317. 
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anyway. Thus, socially disadvantaged people, just like many ethnic minorities, tend 
to vote rather for a left-wing government.  
In the United States, for instance, prisoners tend to share many of the socioeco-
nomic characteristics of Democratic Party voters.162 This fact has even been admit-
ted by some conservative politicians: One justified the resistance to a reduction of 
franchise limitations with the reasoning ‘prisoners simple do not tend to vote Re-
publican’.163 Although this might be an individual opinion which does not give evi-
dence for a purposeful exclusion, it is crucial that the side-effect is obviously appre-
ciated by some representatives or parties who benefit from the regulations in place. 
In sum, the disproportionate social structure of offenders has a similar impact on the 
voting behaviour of felons like their racial and ethnic composition. Although there 
are obviously sociological overlaps, ie many persons that belong to minorities are 
also socially underprivileged, the cumulation of party-preferences deepens the ef-
fect on the outcome of elections and thus increases the caused distortion. 
 
B) Felony Vote Fostering Pluralism and Contributing to a better Legislation 
Criminal policy and prison regime are topics which are often – if at all – not dis-
cussed in an objective and unbiased way. Rather, public debates, ie debates that are 
not limited to a certain group of criminologists, tend to become emotional, soon. 
From a political perspective, the whole field of criminal law offers little to gain but 
much to lose: Even though a more balanced view has emerged throughout the last 
decades, the majority of the population still blames the legislator for being too lax 
on crime.164 Surveys in many nations have shown that people demand for a stricter 
punishment and for a prompter and more consequent course of action.165  
From my point of view, it is doubtful whether the public opinion is based on prop-
erly reflected facts. The vast majority of citizens have very limited knowledge about 
                                               
162 A Ewald and B Rottinghaus ‘Introduction’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disen-
franchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 1 at 10. 
163 K Chandler, ‘Felon Voting Bill Ensnares Riley‘ Birmingham News 22 June 2003. 
164 See eg KH Reuband, ‘Konstanz und Wandel in der „Strafphilosophie“ der Deutschen – Ausdruck 
stabiler Verhältnisse oder steigender Punitivität? Ergebnisse eines Langzeitvergleichs (1970-2003)’ 
(2007) 18 Soziale Probleme - Zeitschrift für soziale Probleme und soziale Kontrolle 187 at 192. 
165 Ibid. 
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the principles of penology.166 Broad debates about criminal law are mostly superfi-
cial and especially the knowledge about prison regime is marginal. From my point 
of view, this lack of insight and interest is – among other factors – also caused by 
the limited voice criminals (and prisoners in particular) have in society and the po-
litical decision process. Whenever issues of criminal law are discussed in the media, 
the opinions of legal scholars, judges or victims receive more attention than those of 
the persons actually affected by penologic measurements. In order to achieve more 
substantiated debates about criminal law and prison regime, felons should be en-
couraged and enabled to participate more actively in these debates. 
 
I) Criminal Law and the Impact of Legal Policy 
Criminal law is (at least in parts) a highly political matter. On the one hand, many 
conducts which have been severely punished in former times are socially accepted 
today;167 on the other hand, several courses of action, especially in conjunction with 
new technologies, have only been made punishable in recent years.168 Moreover, 
penal laws vary greatly among different countries and are subject to cultural influ-
ences.169 Drug policy shows a good example: the prohibition of certain substances 
is indeed determined by their harmfulness and addictiveness; at the same time, 
however, traditions and political considerations play an important role, too. The 
prohibition of alcohol in the United States during the early 20th century was simply 
based on a political appreciation of values, which neither proved to be capable of 
winning a majority nor enforceable. If at that time, all persons who had not adhered 
to the ban in the past were excluded from the ongoing political debate and the deci-
sion making process, the unsuccessful experiment had probably continued much 
longer.  
Criminals with personal experience usually have more knowledge and concern 
about the field of criminal law – they are in a way ‘experts’ on the particular field of 
                                               
166 See H Sutter, cited in ‘Erziehen statt Strafen’, Tink 05 March 2007, available at 
http://www.tink.ch/new/article/2007/03/05/erziehen-statt-strafen/ [last accessed on 05 December 
2011]. 
167 Especially sexual offences have been subject to noteworthy legal changes. 
168 For example, the so-called cyber-crimes. 
169 See eg religiously determined penal laws in Islamic countries.  
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crime and their interest in crime policy is quite distinct.170 At the same time a huge 
amount of incarcerations is based on prohibitions which are at least partly political. 
For example, in the US, the amount of prisoners sentenced for drug offences makes 
up about one fourth of the whole prison inmates.171 Disenfranchisement leads to the 
questionable consequence that those who support the liberalisation of drug laws 
(and demonstrated this attitude by their behaviour) are excluded from the decision 
making process for exactly the same reason.172  
Moreover, the (above discussed) racial disparity is most pronounced among this 
group: It is estimated that almost three quarter of incarcerated drug offenders in the 
US are black.173 This combination of political issues and disproportional exclusion 
of a minority group is especially crucial because it complicates the control whether 
some statutes’ underlying purpose in reality is not a discriminatory one.174 
Some legal scholars have expressed the fear that voting patterns of felons might be 
subversive to the goals and interests of average citizens. As data on prisoners’ elec-
toral behaviour is limited, this statement appears to be quite speculative.175 In any 
case, it cannot serve as a justification for exclusion: In a democracy, minority opin-
ions must be considered appropriately – sometimes, they even require special pro-
tection. Although it demands more efforts to convince certain people of a way that 
is advantageous for society as a whole, this often grinding process is important in 
order to uphold democratic principles and to foster pluralism.176 
This would be different, however, if ex-offenders and felons, who are entitled to 
vote, would raise support for corrupt candidates or would try to annul an effective 
criminal code. Although this fear is sometimes stated in defence of disenfranchise-
ment,177 the assumption is based on the unproved theory, criminals would somehow 
                                               
170 D Parkes, ‘Ballot Boxes behind Bars: Towards the Repeal of Prisoner Disenfranchisement Laws’ 
(2003-2004) 13 The Temple Political & Civil Rights LR 71 at 96. 
171 EA Hull, ‘Our “crocked Timber”: Why is American Punishment so Harsh?’ in A Ewald and B 
Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 136 at 149. 
172 Richardson v Ramirez, 418 US 24 (1974) dissenting vote of J Marshall at 82-83. 
173 RL Nunn, ‘Lock them up and Throw away the Vote’ (2004-2005) 5 Chicago J Int’l Law 763 at 
768. 
174 See above Chapter IV A I. 
175 E Eckholm, ‘States Are Growing More Lenient in Allowing Felons to Vote‘ The New York Times 
12 October 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/12/us/12felons.html [last accessed on 
05 December 2011]. 
176 Richardson v Ramirez, 418 US 24 (1974), dissenting vote of J Marshall at 81. 
177 Argumentation outlined by TJ Miles, ‘Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout‘ (2004) 33 J 
Legal Stud 85 at 120. 
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form a voting bloc in order to pursue similar interests. From an objective point of 
view, this hypothesis seems to be mostly determined by vague fears of infiltra-
tion.178 In reality, prisoners do not form a homogenous group and their interests and 
objectives differ just as much as those of average citizens. Moreover, the relatively 
small proportion of felons among the overall population illustrates the irrationality 
of these misgivings. Especially in stable democracies it is very unlikely that grant-
ing franchise to (ex-) offenders would cause noteworthy anti-democratic move-
ments or attacks.179 If at all, prisoners’ voting behaviour is rather comparable to the 
one of non-delinquents of a similar racial, ethnic and social composition.180 If one 
really wants to safeguard the democratic system from (ex-) offenders it would be far 
more adequate and promising to limit the access to key positions in civil service or 
government.181 
 
II) Participation Encouraging Political Debate about Prison Regime 
Different to any other social group which is excluded from elections (like eg minors 
or people of unsound mind), prisoners do not have a proper lobby advocating their 
rights. Therefore, felons are especially dependent on the representatives – those 
who constantly point out, they represented all people: the parliamentarians. This 
principle of universal representativeness182 (in conjunction with the goals of inclu-
sion, equality and cohesion) demands for the paramount consideration of those peo-
ple who already stand at the edge of society. Unfortunately, in terms of prisoners 
this noble ambition only reflects a small part of the reality. The big amount of (often 
successful) constitutional complaints against inhuman conditions in prisons, even in 
countries of the so-called first world, highlights that the attention which prison re-
gime receives from the government, is still insufficient.183 
                                               
178 TJ Miles, ‘Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout‘ (2004) 33 J Legal Stud 85 at 120-121. 
179 NV Demleitner ‘Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon 
Disenfranchisement as an Alternative’ (1999/2000) 84 Minnesota LR, 753 at 793. 
180 P Street, ‘Race, Prison, and Poverty – The Race To Incarcerate In The Age Of Correctional 
Keynesianism‘ available at http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/streeracpripov.html [last ac-
cessed on 05 December 2011]. 
181 TJ Miles, ‘Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout‘ (2004) 33 J Legal Stud 85 at 121. 
182 This idea is quite universal among democratic states and specified in many constitutions, see eg 
Art. 38 para. 1 of the German Basic Law. 
183 In Germany, for example, the number recently raised to 400 individual complaints in only one 
year, see H Kistenfeger interviewing G Lübbe-Wolff, ‘Brutalisiert statt Resozialisiert’ Focus 12 
March 2007. 
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Granting prisoners the right to vote may raise prisoners’ interest in politics and vice 
versa: According to Danish reports, upcoming elections do influence the debates 
among prison inmates.184 It has been observed that debates circle more around na-
tional criminal policy and similar matters which are of particular importance for 
prisoners and affect their daily life.185 These debates do not necessarily stay locked 
behind prison walls: especially election campaigns are a suitable occasion for poli-
ticians to get in touch with often neglected minorities. Due to the electoral equality, 
meetings in connection with election campaigns are predestined to breathe life into 
J Sachs claim that ‘everybody counts’.186 
While a survey among Danish prisons has revealed that politicians have not ar-
ranged any meetings or other events in the run-up of elections in prisons187 this is 
different in other countries: for example in Quebec, where provincial laws allow all 
felons to vote, candidates have also visited prisons and discussed with inmates.188 
Unfortunately, there is hardly any information or feedback about these get-
togethers. Yet, the example illustrates, that election campaigns can show a good 
reason for politicians to minister prisoners’ interests which in turn may raise the 
level of debate about penal policy.189 In any case, it is a first important step that de-
livers valuable insight into practical aspects of prison regime to politicians and at 
the same time shows inmates that they do matter and that reintegration is not just a 
meaningless phrase.  
 
III) Inclusion as a Prerequisite to Uphold and Improve Democratic Standards 
and Values 
The inclusive function of democratic participation does not only fulfil an important 
penological goal with regard to the individual prisoner.190 Participation is also im-
                                               
184 See A Storgaard, ‘The Right to Vote in Danish Prisons’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) 
Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 244 at 253. 
185 Ibid. 
186 August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others, 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 17-18. 
187 See A Storgaard, ‘The Right to Vote in Danish Prisons’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) 
Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 244 at 253. 
188 D Ritter, ‘Election Night in Lock-up: Polling Offenders as the Votes are Tallied’ Montreal Mir-
ror, 3 December 1998. 
189 The Prison Reform Trust, quoted in The Daily Telegraph, 28 October 2000. 
190 See Chapter III, Section B IV – ‘Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Education’. 
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portant in order to uphold peaceful co-existence in society, to maintain public safety 
and it even seems to reduce the relapse rate of felons.191 
It is a trivial finding, of course, that participation is best effected through the elec-
toral and legislative process, rather than through rebellion, rioting or back-room in-
fluence.192 However, disenfranchisement may abet exactly these undesirable prac-
tices. Offenders have already demonstrated that they do not flinch from finding ‘al-
ternative ways’ in order to achieve their goals. Of course, this fact may not serve as 
an argument for granting people influence which they might – in a different form – 
gain anyway. Still, the example illustrates the importance of inclusion for equality 
among citizens and the maintenance of the basic rules of democracy. 
Moreover, the outlined negative effects are not limited to the actual decision mak-
ing process. Rather, prisoners who are excluded from participation in the law-
making process are also less likely to identify with the passed legislation. This may 
on the one hand erodes the basis for convictive and punitive measurements;193 on 
the other hand, criminals might not feel fully bound by the enacted statutes after 
their release.194 Although from a legal perspective this is of course completely ir-
relevant, the psychological effect of allegiance must not be underestimated.  
For the given reasons, encouraging offenders to consider themselves as fully-
fledged members of society – which in particular requires granting them the right to 
vote – helps to create a more homogenous society with universally acknowledged 
values.195  
 
C) Justifications of Felony Disenfranchisement 
After the elaborate outline of disenfranchisement’s shortcomings, a holistic analysis 
must also consider the arguments brought forward by the asserters of the measure. 
Is has already been found above that disenfranchisement may only serve as a viable 
                                               
191 L Ispahani, ‘Voting Rights and Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Criminal Disenfran-
chisement Laws’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an Interna-
tional Perspective (2009) 25 at 32. 
192 D Parkes, ‘Ballot Boxes behind Bars: Towards the Repeal of Prisoner Disenfranchisement Laws’ 
(2003-2004) 13 The Temple Political & Civil Rights LR 71 at 94. 
193 Sauvé v Canada (No 2), 3 SCR (2002) 519 at 30-34. 
194 Ibid at 37. 
195 J Manza, ‘Foreword: Waves of Democracy and Criminal Disenfranchisement’ in A Ewald and B 
Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) xi at xiii. 
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punitive measurement in very few cases where there is a rational connection be-
tween the felonious breach and the election process.196 Still, some arguments are 
frequently used in order to defend franchise limitations as an important instrument 
to uphold ultimate democratic principles:  
 
I) The ‘Purity of the Ballot Box’ 
Especially from a traditional and conservative perspective, elections are considered 
to be a democracy’s most important sanctuary.197 To uphold the specific dignity, 
some legal scholars and politicians argue, the participants in elections had to fulfil 
certain criteria that prove them to be fully-fledged citizens. Otherwise, the participa-
tion of ‘unworthy electors’ would ‘pollute’ the election process and the electoral re-
sult.  
The language used in connection with this reasoning shows that the idea has a long 
history. The catch-phrase which is typically used to describe the argumentation - 
‘The Purity of the Ballot Box’ – goes back to a ruling of the Alabama Supreme 
Court from 1884.198 From a historical perspective, the argumentation seems clear 
and coherent. At that time, the democratic system was by far not as established and 
stable as it is today. People were especially concerned, that offenders would not act 
in the best interest of the community but vote ‘in concert’ in order to weaken re-
strictions of criminal law and thus threaten the established achievements.199 There-
fore, the moral uprightness of the population – often paraphrased with the key 
words ‘moral citizens’ – was of great importance.200 
As already discussed above, these arguments have lost a lot of their conclusiveness 
with regard to modern democracies which have established alternative ways to pro-
                                               
196 See Chapter III above. 
197 Remember, how many people, especially in rural areas, dress up on election day when they go to 
the polling station in order to cast their vote. 
198 Washington v State 1884, 585. 
199 A Ewald, ‘An "Agenda For Demolition": The Fallacy and the Danger of the "Subversive Voting" 
Argument for Felony’ (2004) 36 Columbia Human Rights LR 109, 111; SE Marquardt, ‘Deprivation 
of a Felon’s Right to Vote: Constitutional Concerns, Policy Issues and Suggested Reforms for Fel-
ony Disenfranchisement Laws’ (2005) 82 University of Detroit Mercy LR 279 at 285. 
200 NV Demleitner, ‘U.S. Felon disenfranchisement: Parting Ways with Western Europe’ in A Ewald 
and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 79 at 
81. 
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tect their core principles.201 At the same time, the extension of public competences 
and responsibilities has increased the average citizen’s contacts with the state and 
its institutions. Different to former times, citizens have to obey much more rules 
which affect – and sometimes even determine – their everyday life. This higher 
level of dependency has raised the importance of participation and equal suffrage in 
order to balance the growing judicialisation.  
Yet, it is important for the democratic system as a whole to raise or uphold the level 
of acceptance of elections. According to some critics, the impression might arise 
that democratic participation rights are worth less, when they are granted to every-
one: ‘the substance of citizenship becomes weaker’.202 However, the argument of 
‘purity’ is not only raised in connection with the democratic system but also used 
personally by politicians who claim, the legitimacy of their voter mandate was di-
luted by the participation of felons in elections. But may representatives demand to 
be authorised by a law-abiding electorate only? Shortly before the Sauvé decisions, 
Canadian members of government have indeed stated that they did not like the idea 
of elections decided by prisoners.203 The Canadian Constitutional Court addressed 
this issue with a quite technical explanation in its Sauvé (No 2) judgement: As it is 
generally acknowledged, that power in a democracy flows from the people the court 
noted it was difficult to explain, how this power can be used to disenfranchise a part 
of those citizens, who have actually empowered the representatives.204 If any politi-
cian would talk about desirable and undesirable votes in conjunction with elector’s 
ethnic background, this would easily be called racist. So why should a distinction in 
terms of felons not be called discriminatory? 
A slightly different approach to justify disenfranchisement is taken by legal aca-
demics that draw a parallel between minors and criminal offenders: they argue, the 
felonious breach revealed a lack of character and self-control as average adults usu-
                                               
201 For example, the German Basic Law outlines many aspects of such a ‘wehrhafte[r] Demokratie‘ 
when it allows for the prohibition of anticonstitutional parties or grants citizens a right to resist in 
case the democratic order is substantially endangered. 
202 WJ Booth, ‘Foreigners: Insiders, Outsiders and the Ethnics of Membership’ (1997) 57 The Re-
view of Politics 271 at 280. 
203 L Ispahani, ‘Voting Rights and Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Criminal Disenfran-
chisement Laws’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an Interna-
tional Perspective (2009) 25 at 47. 
204 Sauvé v Canada (No 2), 3 SCR (2002) 519 at 31-32. 
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ally adhere to the law.205 Therefore, offenders had demonstrated that they lack char-
acteristics which are generally developed during a citizen’s maturing process. In or-
der to uphold the quality of elections, one should not grant them the same rights that 
law-abiding citizens may enjoy.206 This approach, however, neglects an important 
difference between immaturity and partial law-abidance: a felonious breach can 
happen purposefully and in a reflected way, just as imprisonment can also be the 
consequence of gravely negligent behaviour. In any case, one cannot automatically 
conclude that a criminal act is determined by a lack of maturity. Apart from this, the 
decision to restrict young people’s franchise affects every social group equally and 
does not cause a distortion of electoral equality. For these reasons, the two phenom-
ena are not really comparable.207 
To sum up, the ‘Purity of the ballot box’ argument is – if at all – only convincing at 
first sight. A closer examination reveals that it does not account for the development 
that democracy and statehood have undergone. In any case, it is difficult to justify 
how measurements which limit participation rights – and thus, as stated above, ex-
clude minorities in a disproportional way – may enhance the ‘integrity’ of the elec-
tion process.208 
 
II) The Community and its Right to Define its own Identity 
Some legal scholars argue that it is an indefeasible right of every community to de-
fine its own identity. This process also needs to include the sovereignty to decide 
about the scope of franchise as it must be possible to exclude persons, who – ac-
cording to the view of the majority of this community – do not have a sufficient 
nexus.209 It is also raised, this argumentation was acknowledged in terms of for-
eigners who want to join a (different) community: the regulation of the right of resi-
dence, citizenship and the right of foreigners to vote are noncontroversially issues 
of national legal policy. With regard to prisoners, however, the situation is slightly 
                                               
205 CP Manfredi, ‘In Defence of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) 
Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 259 at 275. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Sauvé v Canada (No 2), 3 SCR (2002) 519 at 37. 
208 R Redman et at, ‘The Politics and Legality of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ in Disenfranchise-
ment’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Per-
spective (2009) 167 at 177. 
209 LH Tribe ‘American Constitutional Law’ 2ed (1988) 1084. 
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different. Unlike foreigners, felons have already been part of the community. More-
over, foreigners are already part of a different community, the one in their home 
country, and only want to change their belonging; hardly ever, they are excluded 
from any community.210 
The definition of a community’s own identity is a crucial step which often takes 
place in a highly emotional atmosphere.211 Especially in the media, discussions 
about disenfranchisement easily tend to become lurid and sensational: ‘Killers go 
Get the Vote’212 was only one recent headline illustrating the shallowness of the 
public debate.213 It is indeed quite likely, that felony disenfranchisement is sup-
ported by the majority of citizens in many countries.214 For this reason, politicians 
tend to refrain from the liberalisation of disenfranchisement laws. Rather, they leave 
unpopular decisions to the courts and blame them for the ‘undesirable’ outcome(s) 
afterwards.215 Recent decisions of constitutional courts ar und the world have re-
vealed a lack of governmental action in this field of law. The judgements have out-
lined detailed criteria and requirements which franchise legislation has to meet. 
These guidelines now make it much more challenging for governments to develop 
coherent justifications of disenfranchisement.216  
One of the justifications, which is still used by governments to defend disenfran-
chisement laws in court, is that granting the right to vote to individuals who have 
gravely violated the law would make the government appear soft on crime.217 This 
argumentation also reflects a popular view among many societies. Even the South 
African Constitutional Court conceded in its first decision on felony franchise legis-
lation, that ‘in a country like [South Africa] the idea that murderers, rapists and 
                                               
210 A parallel example can be found in the field of citizenship law: there, it is an important maxim to 
avoid statelessness of individuals and deprivation of citizenship is generally deplored under interna-
tional law.    
211 See eg the long and ongoing debates about migration in many countries, especially in the ‘first 
world’. 
212 The Sunday Mail, Brisbane, 9 July 1995 at 1. 
213 C Hamilton and R Lines, ‘The Campaign for Prisoner Voting Rights in Ireland’ in A Ewald and B 
Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 205 at 216. 
214 R Redman et at, ‘The Politics and Legality of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ in A Ewald and B 
Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 167 at 178. 
215 A Ewald and B Rottinghaus ‘Introduction’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disen-
franchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 1 at 8. 
216 L Ispahani, ‘Voting Rights and Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Criminal Disenfran-
chisement Laws’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an Interna-
tional Perspective (2009) 25 at 33. 
217 See eg Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration 
of Offenders (NICRO) and Others, 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) at para 46, 55. 
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armed robbers should be entitled to vote will offend many people.’218 In the United 
Kingdom, political discussions in the aftermath of the ECtHR’s Hirst (No 2) deci-
sion even revealed that popularity among the electorate was apparently considered 
to be more important than the implementation of judicial demands: the UK’s gov-
ernment and parliament have postponed the adoption of a bill which ought to adjust 
UK’s electoral law according to the standards of the ECHR’s Article 3 for more 
than six years now and it is still not clear whether the judgement’s demands will 
ever be transformed.  
The protection of minority rights demands from law-makers in a representative de-
mocracy to seek for more tolerance and to calm down emotions. In any case, minor-
ity rights cannot be safeguarded by majority decisions only. The maintenance of 
democratic standards also demands for control and supervision. The German consti-
tutional lawyer Christoph Möllers has once put it bluntly: ‘In a democracy, parlia-
ments have the first, but courts the final say’.219 From my point of view, it would be 
favourable to leave not only the final decision about the scope of disenfranchise-
ment laws to a neutral body. Rather, courts should also be entitled to decide about 
every individual implementation of disenfranchisement. Such a proceeding would 
ensure a balanced and well-reasoned imposition. As criminal courts have to come to 
an individual decision about the degree of penalty, anyway, the imposition of disen-
franchisement could easily be an annex decision with may consider the specific 
crime and the overall circumstances. This approach would ensure the repetitively 
demanded proportionality and individual connectivity220 – principles which cannot 
be guaranteed by a simple ‘decision of the people’. 
 
III) Prevention of Voter Fraud 
People who have already broken the law are commonly considered to be more 
prone to commit further felonious breaches. Therefore, another justification which 
is frequently brought forward in defence of disenfranchisement is that ex-felons 
were more likely to commit voter fraud and thus pose a threat to proper election 
                                               
218 August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others, 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 31. 
219 C Möllers, ‘Demokratie – Zumutungen und Versprechen’ (2008). 
220 RL Nunn, ‘Lock them up and Throw away the Vote’ (2004-2005) 5 Chicago J Int’l Law 763 at 
769. 
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proceedings.221 However, this assumption is a way too broad generalisation as most 
criminal offenders have never been involved in any election related crimes.222 
Moreover, these kinds of crimes have a very different character to most of the 
common breaches of law. Also, the electoral process is neither extraordinarily sus-
ceptible to criminal infiltration nor would related criminal incidents threaten objects 
of legal protection in a concrete way – like it would eg be the case with the issuing 
of a gun license. Therefore, the fear of an irregular election process is not a con-
vincing argument against offenders’ franchise. 
 
D) Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that felony disenfranchisement severely affects electoral 
equality and puts ethnic and social minorities at a disadvantage. Due to the diverg-
ing voting behaviour of prisoners (compared to the total electorate), the measure 
also distorts the final outcome of elections and thus affects the democratic process 
as a whole. Moreover, the exclusion of felons from political debates inhibits plural-
ism and deprives society from valuable insight. 
Of course, the intensity of these effects very much depends on the concrete design 
of disenfranchisement laws: while the imposition in some rationally connected 
cases seems to be reasonable, blanket bans and especially permanent deprivation of 
the right to vote pose a serious threat to the universality of elections. Therefore, the 
limitation of disenfranchisement to specific crimes is also preferable from a democ-
ratic theory perspective: restrictions of franchise are rather a matter for the criminal 
code than for an electoral act.223 In any case, if one takes electoral equality seri-
ously, the fact that the votes of prisoners may have a (deciding) influence on the 
outcome of elections has to be acknowledged as an argument in favour of unlimited 
franchise rather than against it.224 
 
                                               
221 See the outline in NV Demleitner ‘Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German 
Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative’ (1999/2000) 84 Minnesota LR, 753 at 773. 
222 NV Demleitner ‘Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon 
Disenfranchisement as an Alternative’ (1999/2000) 84 Minnesota LR, 753 at 773. 
223 R Redman et at, ‘The Politics and Legality of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ in A Ewald and B 
Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 167 at 179. 
224 D Parkes, ‘Ballot Boxes behind Bars: Towards the Repeal of Prisoner Disenfranchisement Laws’ 
(2003-2004) 13 The Temple Political & Civil Rights LR 71 at 76.  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
50 
 
CHAPTER V: PRACTICAL PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH PRISONERS’ RIGHT TO 
VOTE 
In conjunction with the NICRO case, the Republic of South Africa has tried to de-
fend prisoners’ disenfranchisement inter alia with practical difficulties caused by 
prisoner voting, namely high costs for the administration and logistical problems.225 
Although this argument was easily dismissed by the Constitutional Court, it is 
worth to analyse which challenges countries that implement felony franchise might 
have to master and how countries that already allow prisoners to vote deal with 
these issues. 
 
A) Challenges of Electoral Administration in Prison 
To effectively grant prisoners the right to vote, words alone are not enough: Until 
recently, a number of states did not explicitly limit felony franchise but prison walls 
posed a practical obstacle to the execution of the right: In Denmark, for instance, 
prisoners until the 1970s could only cast their votes if they coincidentally had per-
mission to leave prison for other reasons on election day;226 in Ireland, prisoners for 
a long time did not fall within any of the groups that were eligible for postal vote.227 
These examples show that franchise was – and sometimes still is – limited ‘not by 
legislation but by logistics’.228 
Without doubt, the exceptional conditions in penitentiaries require some adjust-
ments of usual election proceedings. Especially the perpetuation of prison safety 
and the guarantee of a well-ordered voting process are frequently considered to be 
sensitive areas.229 For example, the separation of offenders who are not allowed to 
contact each other – a measure which is quite often imposed on culprits in detention 
while awaiting trial – may demand some logistical efforts. As prison authorities, 
                                               
225 Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Of-
fenders (NICRO) and Others, 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) at para 49. 
226 A Storgaard, ‘The Right to Vote in Danish Prisons’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal 
Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 244 at 251. 
227 C Gallagher, ‘The Captive Vote: Prisoners’ Suffrage in Ireland’, (2001) 1 University College 
Dublin LR 1 at 2. 
228 L Muntingh and J Sloth-Nielsen, ‘The Ballot as a Bulwark: Prisoners’ Rights to Vote in South 
Africa’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Per-
spective (2009) 221 at 233. 
229 J Manza, ‘Foreword: Waves of Democracy and Criminal Disenfranchisement’ in A Ewald and B 
Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) xi at xiii. 
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however, can model the voting process both temporally and spatially, it is not too 
difficult to obviate undesirable contacts. Generally, the avoidance of mass gather-
ings may also ensure a well-ordered voting process, ie particularly guarantee the se-
crecy of the ballot and prevent attempts of unwanted influence. Practical experi-
ences among countries where felons are already allowed to vote confirm these as-
sumptions: According to a survey by Laleh Ispahani, none of the observed countries 
has experienced any disruptions of prison security in connection with elections.230 
Moreover, concerns about additional burdens for prison staff did not prove true as 
the procedure became routine, soon.231 
The examination of different approaches around the world shows that there are 
various options for prison authorities to enable prison inmates to cast their vote. 
South Africa, for instance, sets up extra polling stations inside the prisons.232 Sev-
eral European countries use mobile polling stations which are temporarily brought 
to the penitentiaries. Contrary to initial fears, the creation of such facilities proved 
to be comparatively cheap and easy: As the inmates are permanently supervised the 
establishment of administrative control in order to ensure fair elections is actually 
less challenging than outside of prisons.233 Apart from physical polling places in 
prison, absentee ballots are also a common way to enable felony vote.234 This form 
of organisation keeps the additional efforts to a minimum as prisoners do not even 
have to leave their cells.   
In some of the small European states like Luxembourg and Malta, prisoners are 
even allowed to leave the prison on election day – some accompanied by an escort, 
others on their own – in order to cast their vote in their ordinary polling station.235 
This, of course, is a highly symbolic gesture that may foster the reintegration of fel-
ons: For one day, they are part of the ‘usual people’ again and may even participate 
                                               
230 L Ispahani, ‘Voting Rights and Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Criminal Disenfran-
chisement Laws’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an Interna-
tional Perspective (2009) 25 at 51. 
231 J Manza, ‘Foreword: Waves of Democracy and Criminal Disenfranchisement’ in A Ewald and B 
Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) xi at xiii. 
232 A Ewald and B Rottinghaus ‘Introduction’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disen-
franchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 1 at 17. 
233 L Ispahani, ‘Voting Rights and Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Criminal Disenfran-
chisement Laws’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an Interna-
tional Perspective (2009) 25 at 51. 
234 This mechanism is used eg in Switzerland, Slovenia and Lithuania, cf. L Ispahani, ‘Voting Rights 
and Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws’ in A Ewald and 
B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 25 at 51. 
235 See ibid at 30, 52. 
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in an important decision. However, due to the fact that prisoners have to vote in the 
constituency of their home domicile, this option is limited to small states only.  
 
B) The Allocation of Prisoners’ Votes to a Specific Constituency  
As outlined above, prisoners do not represent a cross section of the overall popula-
tion. Therefore, a disproportional gathering of this group in the constituency where 
the penitentiary is located could easily distort the election result. This would be es-
pecially problematic in majority vote systems as these systems tend to reward re-
gional strengths more than a constantly mediocre result in the whole country. Con-
sequently, the success of one party in a specific constituency is not compensated in 
terms of the nationwide result. To avoid such distortions, it is common to assign 
prisoners’ votes to their constituency of residence before their incarceration (home 
district) or to the constituency where they were convicted.236 This is also reason-
able, as prisoners only have a political stake in this region, while they have not been 
in contact with the community at the place of incarceration.237 Moreover, prisoners 
do not gain disproportional influence in local elections, ie in the municipality where 
the prison is located.238 In terms of reintegration, elections might thus be a good op-
portunity for felons to catch up on the recent events in their home constituency.  
While this approach is straightforward and convincing, the practical implementation 
might cause some difficulties: If physical polling stations are set up in prisons, the 
votes cannot be gathered jointly as the individual ballots have to be allocated to the 
prisoners’ home district afterwards. Thus, ballots have to be individualised, a meas-
ure which may erode the principle of secret ballot.239 However, this difficulty also 
exists with postal vote: In order to prevent the selling and buying of votes, postal 
voters in many countries have to sign a personal declaration, filed together with the 
                                               
236 Ibid at 47. 
237 NV Demleitner, ‘U.S. Felon disenfranchisement: Parting Ways with Western Europe’ in A Ewald 
and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 79 at 
95. 
238 L Ispahani, ‘Voting Rights and Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Criminal Disenfran-
chisement Laws’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an Interna-
tional Perspective (2009) 25 at 51. 
239 A ‘partial individualisation’ according to the constituencies would generally be sufficient, al-
though, in turn, this would disproportionally affect those prisoners who are the only inmate from 
their home district. 
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actual ballot in one envelope.240 However, the fact that the voter’s name is not dis-
played on the ballot itself guarantees a sufficient level of data protection. There is 
no reason why one could not implement a similar system for prison votes.  
 
C) How to Guarantee an Appropriate Minimum Standard of Objective Infor-
mation? 
Article 19 of the ICCPR states that the proper execution of the right of freedom of 
expression requires to ‘seek, receive and impart information [...] regardless of fron-
tiers, either orally, in written or in print [...]’. In a similar way, the UNHRC in con-
junction with Art 25 of the ICCPR demanded for conditions that guaranteed ‘an in-
formed right to vote’.241  
With regard to the isolated situation of prisoners, the adequate provision of informa-
tion is of particular importance. Of course, direct contact with candidates who visit 
prisons as part of their election campaign (like this is frequently the case in Quebec, 
see above) are an ideal way of opinion making. As this face to face contact, how-
ever, is neither common among many countries nor an opportunity to provide a ho-
listic overview of all candidates and programmes, the responsible authorities have 
mostly attended to the issue of voter education: state institutions and NGOs usually 
provide information in the forefront of elections.242 Furthermore, political parties 
are allowed and encouraged to distribute written campaign material among prison-
ers.243 Finally, modern technique facilitates the flow of information, too: most pris-
oners have access to radio and television and can follow news, reports and election 
speeches.244 Still, prisoners are mostly excluded from the internet based election 
campaign, a type of information search that is getting more and more important. 
                                               
240 See eg Art 36 para 1a of the German Bundeswahlgesetz. 
241 R Redman et at, ‘The Politics and Legality of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ in Disenfranchise-
ment’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Per-
spective (2009) 167 at 189-190. 
242 L Ispahani, ‘Voting Rights and Human Rights: A Comparative Analysis of Criminal Disenfran-
chisement Laws’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an Interna-
tional Perspective (2009) 25 at 27. 
243 A Storgaard, ‘The Right to Vote in Danish Prisons’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal 
Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 244 at 253. 
244 Ibid. 
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Taking everything into account, prisoners do not have precisely the same opportuni-
ties to actively gather information. However, the provided information is generally 
sufficient and well-balanced enough to ensure a reflected and unswayed decision.  
 
D) Conclusion 
As Tulkens and Zagrebelsky have stated in their joint concurring opinion in the case 
of Hirst (No 2), there are no practical problems connected with prisoners’ right to 
vote that cannot be solved without any great difficulty.245 Instead, the proper im-
plementation of disenfranchisement faces practical problems, too: due to a laxity of 
enforcement in some US States, ex-felons who ought to be excluded in practice of-
ten have little troubles to register and cast their vote.246 Especially the relocation of 
permanently disenfranchised ex-felons from one state to another overburdens the 
administration in a country without registration.247 In any case, this leads to a big 
inequity which is unacceptable in a rule of law democracy.248 
 
CHAPTER VI: REASONABLE DIFFERENTIATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES OF EMBODI-
MENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE IMPOSITION OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
As outlined throughout the whole work so far, disenfranchisement may only be an 
appropriate measure in exceptional cases when it helps to achieve clearly defined 
penologic goals without undermining the legitimacy of democratic elections. Even 
when one acknowledges this limitation, a number of other issues remain which 
should be considered in order to achieve a well-balanced sentence. Such kind of vi-
able distinguishing criteria may eg be the status of incarceration, extraordinary rea-
sons for the imprisonment or time and duration of the imposition. 
 
 
                                               
245 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (Application No 74025/01) (6 October 2005) European Court of 
Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Joint Concurring Opinions of Judges Tulkens and Zagrebelsky at 
5. 
246 TJ Miles, ‘Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout‘ (2004) 33 J Legal Stud 85 at 116. 
247 Ibid at 117. 
248 Ibid at 116. 
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A) Differentiations Considering the Status of the Prisoner - Circumstances as a 
Result of which Disenfranchisement is not Applicable 
I) Detention while Awaiting Trial vs Imprisonment as a Sanction 
In the August case, the South African Constitutional Court outlined that more than 
one third of the incarcerated persons (about 54,000 out of 146,000) were unsen-
tenced prisoners awaiting trial.249 Although the share of remand prisoners is signifi-
cantly lower among many other states, there are important differences between sen-
tenced and unsentenced prisoners which demand for a disparate treatment of both 
groups.250 Firstly, the presumption of innocence is one of the most important legal 
rights of the accused in a criminal trial. Therefore, only the imposition of measures 
which are essential to ensure the regularity of the upcoming criminal trial or to pro-
tect society from violent suspects can be justified.251 Secondly, the decision whether 
an accused is kept in pre-trial custody or temporarily released on bail is not only de-
termined by characteristics of the alleged offender or the offence itself. Rather, the 
risk of absconding is mostly assessed on the basis of the accused’s social back-
ground, his or her financial situation and similar characteristics. If detainees await-
ing trial were deprived of their franchise, such factors which are outside the influ-
ence of the individual suspected persons would define the scope of suffrage. In 
other words: The consideration of personal circumstances may be reasonable and 
acceptable with regard to the decision about pre-trial custody, but would distort the 
social equality of elections if it also affected the culprit’s franchise. Finally, such a 
practice would put those individuals who are later acquitted at an incompensable 
disadvantage. Due to these manifold problems, also the UNHRC has demanded that 
‘[p]ersons who are deprived of liberty but who have not been convicted should not 
be excluded from exercising the right to vote’.252 
 
 
 
                                               
249 August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others, 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) para 12. 
250 N Mbodla, ‘Should Prisoners have a Right to Vote?’ (2002) 46 Journal of African Law 92 at 96. 
251 Requirements for the detention of a suspect are eg outlined in the German Criminal Procedure 
Code (Art 112 para 2 StPO). 
252 Human Rights Committee, Gorji-Dinka v. Cameroon, CCPR/C/83/D/1134/2002, 10 May 2005 at 
para 5.6. 
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II) Imprisonment as a Penalty vs Extended Term of Imprisonment 
In the case of Hirst (No 2), the actual prison sentence of the inmate had already 
ended and the incarceration of John Hirst, who had been found guilty for man-
slaughter, was only extended in order to protect society.253 Generally, perpetrators 
in preventive detention have already served their sentence. Thus, any further meas-
ures which are aimed at the protection of society must be essential for the achieve-
ment of this goal.254 Disenfranchisement, however, is at least to a certain extent a 
form of additional punishment.255 In contrast, the measure is not necessary to pro-
tect society even if the committed offence is rationally connected with the election 
process because the perpetrators are sufficiently controlled in order to prevent re-
peat offences. 
 
III) Incarceration due to the Inability to Pay a Fine 
Some prisoners who have only been sentenced to a fine are later sent to prison be-
cause they are unable to pay this penalty. To disenfranchise those offenders who are 
only incarcerated because of their financial situation would put underprivileged 
people at a disadvantage. The disproportional influence of wealth on the right to 
vote would violate important democratic and human rights principles and again run 
contrary to the principle of electoral equality.256 Therefore, disenfranchisement 
should not be imposed on prisoners in subsidiary detention.257 
 
 
                                               
253 WA Powers, ‘Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2): A First Look at Prisoner Disenfranchisement by 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005-2006) 21 Connecticut J Int’l Law 269. 
254 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (Application No 74025/01) (6 October 2005) European Court of 
Human Rights (Grand Chamber Decision) at 49. 
255 See Chapter III A above. 
256 See Chapter II A and B above. 
257 This exception had also been made in South Africa, before the Constitutional Court struck down 
the franchise limitations, see C Uggen et at ‘Punishment and Social Exclusions: National Differences 
in Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement 
in an International Perspective (2009) 59 at 73; RJ Wilson ‘The Right to Universal, Equal and Non-
discriminatory Suffrage as a Norm of Customary International Law: Protecting the Prisoner’s Right 
to Vote’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Per-
spective (2009) 109 at 130. 
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B) Disenfranchisement for Certain Offences: Decision, Duration and Time of 
Imposition 
The most important distinction in terms of felony disenfranchisement is to consider 
the individual felonious breach and to restrict franchise limitations to rationally 
connected offences only.258 For the reasons given in Chapter III and IV, most of the 
Western European countries today only implement franchise limitations when the 
offence aimed to undermine democratic rights or institutions like this is the case 
with voting fraud, vote rigging, abuse of office or similar offences.259 As the ECtHR 
in its Hirst (No 2) decision has demanded for a ‘more limited restriction’ which 
must comply with the principle of proportionality, this approach is also more likely 
to meet the requirements of international human rights law.260 However, the way of 
implementation has to take into account several other factors in order to best 
achieve the penological goals and to obtain a coherent and proportional decision: 
   
I) Individual Decision by the Criminal Court vs Automatic Implementation 
In its Sauvé (No 2) judgement, the Canadian Supreme Court suggested that the deci-
sion about franchise limitations should be made on a case-by-case basis by the re-
sponsible criminal court. In this way, it could be evaluated whether the offender 
really warrants the additional sanction.261 On the long run, individual decisions of 
the ruling criminal courts could evolve a sophisticated case law which could better 
take account of individual peculiarities than any parliamentary statute could do. 
Several legal scholars are also convinced that such an approach would best ensure 
objectivity, independence and consistency.262 
Practical experiences also prove the feasibility of this approach: In Germany, for 
example, the ruling court has to give a rationale for the imposition of disenfran-
                                               
258 See the detailed outline in Chapter III and IV above. 
259 NV Demleitner, ‘U.S. Felon disenfranchisement: Parting Ways with Western Europe’ in A Ewald 
and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 79 at 
80. 
260 WA Powers, ‘Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2): A First Look at Prisoner Disenfranchisement by 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005-2006) 21 Connecticut J Int’l Law 243 at 287. 
261 See the summarising statement by CP Manfredi, ‘In Defence of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ in 
A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective 
(2009) 259 at 261. 
262 See S Foster, ‘Automatic Forfeiture of Fundamental Rights: Prisoners, Freedom of Expression 
and the Right to Vote’ (2007) 16 Nottingham LJ 1 at 21. 
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chisement in every single case.263 Such an individual decision in open court empha-
sises the sanction’s penal character and shows the offender plainly that it is the se-
verity and seriousness of the committed offence which leads to disenfranchisement 
and that the measure is not just an administrative automatism. A focussed imposi-
tion thus emphasises the exceptional character of the measure and sustains the re-
tributive function. 
A problematic side-effect, however, is that the imposition of franchise limitations 
by the judiciary might narrow the separation of powers because the ruling courts di-
rectly influence the legislative branch when they decides about the electorate.264 To 
reduce this effect, the court decision could be limited to the general imposition of 
disenfranchisement while the length of the measure could be pegged to the length of 
the prison sentence.  
 
II) Duration and Time of Imposition of Disenfranchisement 
1) Disenfranchisement During the Time of Incarceration or after Release 
As outlined above in Chapter III, successful reintegration of the offender demands 
for a full rehabilitation when the individual has served its sentence. A lifelong ban 
from voting like it is common among many states in the US thwarts this goal.  
However, strictly pegging disenfranchisement to the period of incarceration has 
shortcomings, too: Firstly, the penologic goal of incapacitation cannot be achieved 
since the election process in prison is very much controlled and little prone to illegal 
influences, anyway. Therefore, disenfranchisement may only help to reduce election 
related offences when it is imposed for a temporary period after release. Secondly, 
if felony disenfranchisement is simply limited to the time of incarceration, fortui-
tousness would be abetted as the fact if a prisoner is released shortly before or after 
an upcoming election day would gain great relevance: Given that the legislative pe-
riod in a country is eg four years, a culprit sentenced to three and a half years might 
not miss a single election, while another one sentenced to four and a half years 
might even miss two. Therefore, it would be fairer to impose franchise limitations 
                                               
263 NV Demleitner, ‘Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon 
Disenfranchisement as an Alternative’ (1999/2000) 84 Minnesota LR 753 at 764. 
264 N Mbodla, ‘Should Prisoners have a Right to Vote?’ (2002) 46 Journal of African Law 92 at 101. 
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for a specific number of elections.265 In order to achieve the goal of incapacitation, 
it is worth considering whether this fixed period should only start to run when the 
prisoner is released. Moreover, this approach would ensures that all prison inmates 
have the same rights - an issue which should not be underestimated as inequality is 
already quite pronounced due to the usually existing prison hierarchy. In Germany, 
for instance, disenfranchisement may be imposed for a limited period of time for 
certain offences (two to five years, irrespective of the length of the prison sentence), 
and this period of time only begins to run after the offender has been released from 
prison.266 Apart from the outlined advantages, this form of downstream punishment 
has shortcomings, too: Most notably, full reintegration is retarded since disenfran-
chisement only becomes effective after the prison sentence has been served. While 
there are good arguments for either way of timing, it is beyond dispute that a limita-
tion to a certain period of time is required in order to achieve the penologic goals of 
reintegration and special prevention and to meet the requirements of proportional-
ity. 
 
2) Differentiations Considering the Period of Incarceration 
Recent judgements have shown that, if imposed at all, disenfranchisement must be 
proportionate to the offence and the sentence.267 As already outlined above, a blan-
ket ban does not meet the requirements of human rights law and also collides with 
core principles of most states’ constitutions ie their Charters of Fundamental Rights. 
According to the ECtHR, for instance, blanket bans are ‘disproportionate, arbitrary 
and impair the essence of the right to vote’.268 A simple and widespread approach 
that accounts for the graveness of the offence is to link voting rights to the length of 
the imposed prison sentence.269 There are generally two possibilities to consider the 
graveness of the felony: either according to the actual sentence or on the basis of the 
                                               
265 C Gallagher, ‘The Captive Vote: Prisoners’ Suffrage in Ireland’, (2001) 1 University College 
Dublin LR 1 at 6; D Guttman, ‘Before the High Court – Roach v Commonwealth: Is the Blanket 
Disenfranchisement of Convicted Prisoners Unconstitutional?’ (2007) 29 Sydney LR 297 at 318. 
266 NV Demleitner ‘Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon 
Disenfranchisement as an Alternative’ (1999/2000) 84 Minnesota LR, 753 at 760. 
267 Human Rights Committee, Gorji-Dinka v. Cameroon, CCPR/C/83/D/1134/2002, 10 May 2005 at 
para 5.6. 
268 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (Application No 74025/01) (6 October 2005) European Court of 
Human Rights (Grand Chamber) at 45. 
269 N Mbodla, ‘Should Prisoners have a Right to Vote?’ (2002) 46 Journal of African Law 92 at 98. 
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potential, ie maximum sentence for the committed offence.270 Allotting disenfran-
chisement on the basis of the potential sentence, however, has two shortcomings: in 
practical terms, prison authorities usually only know about the actually imposed 
sentence and especially among common law countries it is often difficult to evalu-
ate what maximum sentence would be applicable for the concrete offence.271 More-
over, only the actually imposed sentence accounts for the individual characteristics 
of the concrete felony. Thus, this parameter allows a more balanced penalisation 
and is preferable if the time of imposition is not codified by the legislative branch, 
anyway. A viable additional criterion has been raised by the Australian Constitu-
tional Court in its judgement Roach v. Electoral Commission: the Court acknowl-
edged the general seriousness of disenfranchisement and demanded for a threshold 
that is geared to the length of the prison sentence in order to distinguish between se-
rious lawlessness and less grave but still reprehensible conduct.272 
 
CONCLUSION 
Just like the shape of suffrage in general, the design of prisoners’ franchise regula-
tions has undergone various changes since the emergence of democracies. At any 
stage, however, development was far from linear and even today, democracies have 
not found universal standards in terms of prisoners’ right to vote. While the diver-
sity is somehow surprising, it also provides many experiences and allows an evalua-
tion on a broad factual basis: After all, almost any approach has already been tried 
out.  
Different to the early years of democracies, franchise laws today can no longer be 
designed arbitrarily but have to be in line with principles of constitutional law and 
human rights treaties – important conventions which may not be stopped at the 
prison gate. The drawback of constitutional principles as a protective mechanism 
for felony franchise is that standards differ greatly among nations with different le-
gal traditions and allow much room for individual exceptions: For example in the 
                                               
270 The second option had been chosen by South Africa before the Commonwealth Electoral 
(Amendment) Act 1995, cf. the outline by C Gallagher, ‘The Captive Vote: Prisoners’ Suffrage in 
Ireland’, (2001) 1 University College Dublin LR 1 at 24. 
271 R Redman et at, ‘The Politics and Legality of Prisoner Disenfranchisement’ in Disenfranchise-
ment’ in A Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Per-
spective (2009) 167 at 171. 
272 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) HCA 43 at para 12. 
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United States, recent challenges of disenfranchisement laws which were mostly 
based on either the Fourteenth Amendment or the Voting Rights Act from 1965 
have failed and no final decision of any US Court has abolished or even adjusted a 
state’s practice in terms of felony disenfranchisement.273 Rather, the US Supreme 
Court has explicitly stated that felony disenfranchisement laws do not violate the 
Constitution and its Amendments as long as they are not enacted purposefully in 
order to disadvantage minorities.274 In contrast, multi-national human rights treaties 
offer a more promising chance to unify the legal status quo. Firstly, the negotiation 
of these treaties demands a heightened sense of consensus from the state parties and 
international pressure may encourage the responsible leaders to guarantee basic 
rights, which other states grant their citizens, also to their own population. Sec-
ondly, international monitoring bodies tend to interpret treaties i  a quite dynamic 
way. With the ECtHR’s seminal decision of Hirst (No 2), an international court for 
the first time has sustained prisoners’ right to vote.  
However, the issue in general is rather a political than a legal one: As the concrete 
shape of suffrage pertains to core issues of a democracy, interference from outside 
should be kept to a minimum. Although Hirst (No 2) without doubt is a well-
balanced and well-thought-out decision, the caused discontentment in the UK is 
also understandable: when court decisions ‘impose’ a specific shape of franchise 
laws on a sovereign state, they interfere with fundamental issues of state organisa-
tion and foreclose an appropriate public discourse. Such a debate, however, is im-
portant in order to achieve the necessary acceptance among the people. In terms of 
felony franchise, the main critical issue is that general principles considered by the 
courts on the one hand and the public opinion in countries which still disenfranchise 
prisoners on the other hand, seem to be irreconcilable: in the United States, for ex-
ample, there is no majority for a liberalisation of the relevant statutes: A national 
bill, which aims to grant voting rights to all ex-felons in federal elections after re-
                                               
273 See NV Demleitner ‘Continuing Payment on One's Debt to Society: The German Model of Felon 
Disenfranchisement as an Alternative’ (1999/2000) 84 Minnesota LR, 753 at 777; RL Nunn, ‘Lock 
them up and Throw away the Vote’ (2004-2005) 5 Chicago J Int’l Law 763 at 773. 
274 See Hunter v Underwood, 471 US 222 (1985) 227. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
62 
 
lease failed in the mid of the 1990s.275 Due to public pressure, some jurisdictions in 
the meanwhile have even tightened disenfranchisement laws.276 
At the same time, practically every unbiased analysis of the issue reveals that a 
broad and undifferentiated practice of disenfranchisement does not fulfil penologic 
goals and – what is even more important – significantly distorts election results. 
Considering current developments, these effects are likely to increase in the future, 
as many of the countries that practice disenfranchisement expect a growing share of 
prison inmates and a more diverse social structure with growing class distinctions 
and increasing migration. The suggested reduction of the scope of application of 
disenfranchisement to rationally connected offences only would help to achieve pe-
nologic goals and, at the same time, reduce the negative effect on the legitimacy of 
elections.  
In any case, more political courage is required in order to initiate change: Although 
at first, a liberalisation of felony franchise might face a lot of resistance and lack of 
understanding from the electorate, it would be an important step towards integration 
and equality which would enable culprits to demonstrate their democratic credibil-
ity. 
                                               
275 Voting Rights of Former Offenders Act, H.R. 3028, 104th Cong. (1996) and H.R. 568, 105th 
Cong. (1997). 
276 See NV Demleitner, ‘U.S. Felon disenfranchisement: Parting Ways with Western Europe’ in A 
Ewald and B Rottinghaus (eds) Criminal Disenfranchisement in an International Perspective (2009) 
79 at 83. 
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